Artworks 2010

Antiquarium, replay, 1997-2010
Photographs of a place that no longer exists, the Antiquarium of Mount Celio in Rome where, until recently, the debris of sculptures from antiquity that did not find shelter in the galleries or storerooms of museums were scattered outdoors like old cars in a junkyard. Drippings of boat resin, mixed with fluorescent pigment, anachronistic signs of fragmented time.

antiquarium-replay

Reprints, 1997-2010
Like vampires, natural latex is sensitive to daylight. Exposure to ultraviolet rays causes drying, darkening and makes the latex sticky until it eventually falls into shreds. This organic material is so light sensitive that it is the last material one would use for reproducing photographic images.
It is therefore through a process of redundancy that the traces of its own attempt at conservation leave their imprint. More specifically, this series features two superimposed images: the details of an industrial site that I visited before it was demolished; and the remains of archaeological excavations that are not considered worthy of being displayed in a museum. An exercise in imitation: Piranesi’s Carceri d’invenzione.

reprints

Ex voto Remix, 2009-2010
Etruscan votive images gleaned from catalogues or post cards. These specimens — reminders of health problems or broken hearts taken out of their funerary context – displayed in museums, on coloured carpets and classified by category. Reused here, reproduced on glass, superimposed on paintings by SP, marked by Chinese stamps, without concern for their relatedness. Will we become play things once again?

ex-voto-remix-02-03

Phantombilder, 2010

After completing a project on identification photos of the last century (1920-1970), I began researching new subjects linked to the question of posing and portraiture. The mug shots that I reworked depicted people who did not wished to be photographed. But willing or not, they were actual subjects in the flesh who expressed something more than that for which they were photographed. It is that “something” that I attempted to capture.

The facial composites used by German police today, easily accessible via Internet, are photomontages. They depict no existing subject; they only depict a stage of memory. Though, they are photographs. The Unheimlichkeit (“eeriness”) of the photographic image seems to be two-fold here.

Despite the formal resemblance, these portraits lack the spark of life and the imperfection and asymmetry that distinguishes every human face. These figures seem to be cadavers with wide open eyes, cadavers twice. What could I make them say?

phantombilder

A variant to the Ishihara “pseudo- isochromatic” test (2005)

1 .
In 1917 , Professor Shibaru Ishihara ( 1879-1963 ) , a military doctor and future dean of the Imperial University of Tokyo , who had been a pupil of Stock in Jena, Axenfeld in Freiburg in Breisgau – and von Hess in Munich before being forced to return to his homeland following the outbreak of the First World War , developed a detection system of the daltonisme which is still practiced today , as remembered by all those who have made their “three days” for military service .
This test is made of several colored discs with different inks ( up to nine) , consisting of points of variable size and tone , which make indistinct , except for the color type , a certain sign that is hidden among this set. For example, a colorblind deutan will not easily distinguish a red sign on a predominantly green background .
The ” pseudo- isochromatic ” test called Ishihara – the full version consists of 38 tables – is particularly efficient (98% ) in the individuation of hereditary dyschromatopsias of protan and deutan kind .
Tables 1-25 present Arabic numerals . The numbers are signs whose reading is common to both Western and Eastern , and this is why – presumably – they were used in the international version of the test . Neither the letters of the Latin alphabet, or Chinese pictograms or Egyptian hieroglyphics would – in effect – was readable.
Tables that are 26 to 38 are designed for illiterate children : thery present sinuous traces: the examinee must follow them with a pencil or his own finger .

2 .
The series of works that I propose , modestly , is a cultural variant of the Ishihara test. It is applicable to both illiterate and literate people of any race or color : it is only necessary that the examiner and the examinee  agree on the names to be given to things.
To develop my humble suggestion , I adapted a test for visually impaired children , which is used today in the ophthalmological services of French hospitals : the optometric testing R. Rossano and J -B . Weiss- Inserm , which provides for the identification of some familiar icons of our childhood : car, pram, dog, chicken , flower, and so on.
And it is not without a hint of pride that I propose my test for color deficiency. As a painter and – of course – a specialist in perception , vision and – consequently – the color , I could not not speak with empathy to the 8% of the population that does not perceive – as it should be – the full range of the world around us, and I am confident that this simple synthesis Ishihara – Rossano -Weiss -Inserm -Puglia will help to better realize what they are missing.

(Google translation from French, redirected)

testishiharadaltonisme

Ishihara test

test-rossano-weiss

Rossano-Weiss test



A-museum (2001)

“Could it be that technical means from a distant period, when used at the present time to recreate certain events, touch us even more than the awareness of the events themselves?” (1)
This is the last sentence of Philippe Poirier’s introduction to his performance Leaving Pictures. It points at what is at stake for me in the few reflections that I am going to submit to you. Is it possible to deal with the past “truly” and also “aesthetically”? Is there an ethical necessity, for the researchers and the artists that we are, to be fairly unfaithful to “our” past, beyond being the witnesses and the representatives of a history that is, as such, “our own”? Is there an aesthetical approach which, going beyond the due witnessing, and being both surgical and lyrical, could take us to a fertile destruction of the past, far away from the aesthetisation of memory?
Or should we pay respect to our ancestors –be they victims, persecutors or spectators – and to their feelings and deeds, committing ourselves to the collection and the preservation of what has been left to us? Should we, again, build museums and museums of museums, or should we erect warning memorials and sensible pieces of art? Should we, perhaps, produce monuments out of monuments, like parodies of these protected works of art during the last war?

1.
I already mentioned in a previous talk that last year I was asked to organise an event in Naples, that was to be housed in the building of the ex Asylum for the Poor and that was meant to celebrate the first “Day of the Memory” of the Holocaust. The call that came to me was based on a linguistic misunderstanding and on an incorrect translation. The person who invited me did not register that, when they said “find us an artist”, the people who were running the ex Asylum meant –as  is common by the older generations and in Southern Italy- a performing artist, a man of the scene, an actor, a theatre director. Only after accepting the job did I realise that I was possibly not the man they were looking for, a fact which led to several discussions and confrontations and eventually to indispensable compromises, because we all had to give up our respective aesthetical radicalities. A performative part remained in the final event, but this was limited to the opening and I tried to make it as meaningless as possible. Voices recorded in the streets and arbitrary tableaux vivants were the main elements of this evening.
The permanent exhibition was set up, instead, in a less noisy environment. We didn’t make up the spaces, we didn’t paint a walls and didn’t drive a nails into them. As furniture, we used what was left in the same building from its previous functions. The place stayed  as it was; bare, naked, transparent through history. We arranged a collection: gathering and displaying documents, films, books, internet connections, data bases – with the result that many visitors complained that there was nothing “to see”, while a few came almost every other day.
I do not suggest that this setting wasn’t an aesthetic choice -we always deal aesthetically with the past, if we are not just observers of it-. But our choice was anti-representational. Place and documents, context and text, should speak for themselves, once put into the conditions of speaking. Our assignment was the one of establishing these conditions, being aware that they were precisely determined by the encounter of a particular container with a specific material, where both would be transformed.
Our task wasn’t one of pointing at ethical models -let’s say erecting a monument- nor one of showing evidences and proofs –let’s say building a museum. We weren’t putting together an archive either: while a museum is a place intended to put on view original traces of the past, an archive is an accumulation of original traces kept for a possible upcoming use, with the aspiration to be comprehensive. What was collected in the spaces of the Asylum were representational items, second-degree objects that dealt with the definite subject of the Shoah. Within this process of choosing, gathering and making available, these objects were seen as tools of a potential intellectual engagement. What was being presented was an installation, or a mechanics of documents, or a projection of history.
The aim of this installation was not to “preserve” memory – I still believe that preservation has a strong relation with falsity and therefore is a practice of kitsch – and I still take kitsch to refer to any kind of bad art. Neither did this installation aim at “touching” emotionally –even though there is nothing bad in wanting to “touch”, in art as well as in historiography-. This installed collection offered equipments for thought: rather than proposing aims, it was providing means.

2.
I still ask myself why an artist was needed, to animate the commemoration of a specific historical event like the Holocaust. The answer that I give myself is that to such an emotionally overwhelming and rationally non-understandable occurrence people feel like being able to oppose only the emotional and non-understandable fact of artistic creation. This is the reason why people commit monuments to artists.
Monuments are things that point in some direction with their fingers, they express ultimately the confidence that something can be pointed at, that there are lessons to give and teachings to take, and historical examples to condemn or emulate. They assume that the social body can be moulded by the call to remembrance. Monuments, like museums, are nationalistic inventions. A monument, like Leopardi said, is always optimistic, always addresses itself to a future that is taken for granted, that is embodied in the icon of a collective identity, and inevitably states for its sake a positive message. A monument is always “to” something. A monument that would be “with” something would be either self-erasing or withdrawn; this is the kind of monument that I would like to see. I wonder if it is this being “with” that engages me before Poirier’s performance, not only for its use of the original materials and devices, but for such a use that, while destroying them, creates and projects in the air a new sound which is made of their ghosts. That would be a fruitful betrayal, if it could allow us to touch the past, beyond memory and beyond evidence. Or would this be another idealistic wish?
But what would these non-assertive, these non-identitarian monuments look like?
Having asked myself this question, I made an experiment last year, when I was invited to take part in the Models of Resistance show in Copenhagen. As this city had been, a few years ago, the theatre of a personal experience, I went out overnight and marked the locations of this past experience with the symbol of the monuments protected by the United Nations. Roaming the town in order to find again the places where I had been, I somehow placed the landmarks of a biographical anamnesis that was no more noteworthy than any other.
Rather than as a piece of art, I consider what I made as an exercise, and not only because it was not taking place in an environment devoted to art. These UNESCO signs were mixed up with all the signs that in an urban topography indicate locations, zones, functions, memories; they would hopefully provoke the questioning of some passer-by. What was being applied was an outsider attitude, the appropriation of a procedure and a signalisation that one was not entitled to. At the opposite of the Avant-Garde gesture that raises to the status of art what is originally not art, this spreading the traces of a passage was a rhetorical call to the democratisation of recollection. Instead of an iconic, significant, sublimating sculpture, a fragmentary, mobile, non-systematic tracing out.

3.
“There is no kitsch that ends with a question. All kitsch ends with a statement.” (2)

I agree with Saul Friedländer’s statement, but I also think that one shouldn’t be afraid of kitsch. For instance it could be taken and used as one element of a work, among others; just as successive reproductions can lead so far away from their model as to create another original matter. And I could imagine, as well, a work so absolutely kitschy that it would become a pure art piece, a mere questioning in process.
Very few museums today are built in such a way that the circulation inside their spaces arouses thought and also lays down ambiguities: ambiguity is a good detonator for a process of interpretation. Most historical museums are either mere places of conservation, perhaps with an educational section, or sites for cultural entertainment, where the last thing that should happen to a visitor should be to induce him into boredom. For instance, the young stewards of the new Jewish Museum in Berlin are instructed to say “enjoy” when they check your ticket, and actually once inside you find a number of drawers to open and buttons to push. At the end of the visit you know what you knew already, so to say, that German Jews were also Germans. This is what Friedländer would call “to end with a statement”.
Either conservative or entertaining, a museum that would not be discursive could not be of interest. The only acceptable museum is the one that preserves what doesn’t exist yet, the one that preserves the imaginary of the viewer, the one which really takes its visitor as “a historical subject” (3), the one which would eventually take itself as a historically determined object and would accept its own disintegration.

I wonder why I like to use this adjective “kitschy” in regard to most museums. Is it because they stand for a linear, derivative vision of the historical facts, and mostly portray a narrative which is the one that justifies their own existence? Or simply because of the “inauthentic” relation between the objects and their unoriginal background, and the interrupted prolongation of these objects into time? Archives, actually, cannot be kitschy; they are the “natural” place for dead documents. They do not represent, they stay. Why  can’t we show them as they are? Not only because they wouldn’t be readable, but because there is nothing to stage with a storage room. That would look like a piece of art à la Boltansky or à la Kabakov, but not like something to be used for anything else than aesthetical appreciation or nostalgic longing.

The storage room, perhaps, can be presented as a museum. Anyhow every museum is a fiction. What makes the difference is the degree of intellectual freedom that is allowed to the viewer, the degree, so to say, of democracy within the museum.
Places where everything means something are unbearable (by the way, it is the same with people and with books). This is probably the reason why, being a historian and feeling embodied myself in history, I grew tired of a historiography practised as a demonstrative explanation of signs. The intensity of my relation to history, also in connection with my personal biography, forced me to leave my fellow historians and become something else, as well. What was to be given up was the attempt of making sense of our past, of looking for more or less linear consequences and causes, of trying to renew an “objective” approach to what has been. I would, instead, understand history without understanding. I would instead become an artist.

The last work I would like to mention here is a two-days museum, a recent installation at the Society of the Industrials of Sainte Marie aux Mines, in France. This building housed an interesting collection of naturalistic and archaeological items, put together, at the turn of the 19th Century, during the golden and positivistic age of textile manufacturing. Yet with the decline of this industry and the disappearance of its main figures most of the collections ended up in cellars and attics, where we found them. I decided to make a collection out of the storage room and to present it like a Kunstkabinett: as you know, things in a curiosity cabinet are displayed without any inner hierarchy and with no evolutionary method or respect for the differences between the genres and the fields of knowledge.
In French, the Latin word “museum” can only mean a museum of natural history. This is why I named my installation “Museum of Industrial History”: as a promise that had to be disillusioned -because there was no industrial history to be seen in those spaces-, but also as an allegory of what the heritage of a past life had become. An ever too readable sign of this becoming was a circle of stuffed animals set in the only space still in use, the meeting room. On the walls of the opposite room I hung framed photographs of the meeting room as it was just before my dislocations, and in the middle of the space I “reanimated” an encounter of the ex-members of the Society. I was trying somehow to mix up the times, present tense with past tense with future tense: a conference setting in the demolition site, a ghostly reunion in the depot, old preys in the meeting room. I also combined pieces from my own past work with the leftover collections: would somebody be patient enough to try to recognise what was ”true” and what was not?
I wasn’t fully aware of what I was factually undertaking, I was moving things from one place to another with haste and improvisation. Like in Poirier’s performance in Rome, I was displacing and recomposing original matters “from a distant period”. I knew that I was arranging signs that were not meant for any explanation. I think that I acted like the invited foreigner that I was, as I had been in Naples and Copenhagen: a stranger to a local tradition and largely unaware of its rules, I felt free to misunderstand them. Not having status nor symbol to preserve, I had no discourse to give, but I had the liberty of being one pole of a discourse, as I am here today.

2001

(1)  “Poirier’s Sampling“, in S. Puglia ed., Leaving Pictures. Towards an Art of History, Salerno 1999, p. 65.

(2)  Saul Friedlander, Reflections on Nazism: An Essay on Kitsch and Death, New York 1984, p. 97.

(3)  Michael Fehr, “A Museum and its Memory: the Art of Recovering History”, in S. A. Crane Ed., Museums and Memory, Stanford 2000, p. 59.

Asylum (2001)

During World War II Naples suffered for only twenty days from the Nazi occupation, before a popular uprising and the advance of the Allies pushed the German Army out of the city. There was therefore no time for the organization of a systematic persecution of the Jewish population and  “only” fourteen Neapolitan Jews died as a consequence of racial persecution, having been apprehended in other regions of Italy.
To work on the issue of Shoah in Naples means, though, to appeal to a universal, hopefully common, consciousness, rather than to recall a shared historical experience.
With regard to that, and to the peculiar surroundings in which I have been asked to work, the situation of Naples is far too particular to be taken as an example of a historiographic and museographic installation. It can be proposed, then, as a story.

The event took place in the Albergo dei poveri (or the “Poor’s Hostel”). Its construction began around 1750 on the instruction of the Bourbon king Charles III and was meant to emulate similar initiatives in Europe of that age. These buildings are of the type Foucault describes as the models both of the penitentiary and the factory. They express an authoritarian utopia that represents one of the many sides of the Enlightenment epoch. Such places were meant as a tool for the cleaning up of the nation: beggars, invalids, orphans, prostitutes, elderly or disabled people were taken out of the street and concentrated in such places, either to be just segregated from the public life or to be put to work.
The Neapolitan Albergo dei poveri was supposed to host up to eight thousand inmates (the whole of the estimated marginal layer of the population), but its conception was so megalomaniacal that it was never finished and only three of the original five wings were completed (although, this building remains one of the biggest in Europe). At the beginning of the Nineteenth Century its construction was eventually stalled, and since then it presents the aspect of a huge ruin, half inhabited and half abandoned. It housed, though, up to four thousand people before being progressively emptied. In 1980 an earthquake finally caused the death of eleven elderly residents and this de facto was the end of its use as an asylum. In the following years the palace was looted of almost all the remaining furniture and only in recent years has a project of renovation started. In the meantime social workers took possession of a wing of the Albergo, which as a whole is the property of Naples Municipality.

This then was the site of the proposed event that related to the Holocaust. There is, then, the question of the time period in which such an event could take place.
We have witnessed three phases in the historical recognition of the Shoah. The first one, extending from the end of the War to the mid-Seventies, is characterized by a relative silence about the persecution of the Jews; there have been, though, moments of debate and polemics (in particular around the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem) and the publication of some capital books (Wiesel, Levi, Hilberg). A second phase saw a wide enlargement of the knowledge of what happened, and also the revisionist phenomenon, along with a visual production that reached a large public, like the television series Holocaust (it is interesting to see how the widely accepted denominations for the extermination of the European Jews came from fiction –or documentary- films: today it is considered more correct to employ the term Shoah, that is still the title of a movie). A third phase, which we are living through today, sees the institutionalization and a sort of saturation of memory, where there are rising voices that Jews are “doing too much” (See the foreword to the new edition of Nicole Lapierre, Le silence de la mémoire, Paris 2000).

In January 2000 forty-five States sent their representatives to a conference in Stockholm, where it was decided to hold, in every country, a day of the memory. Such a day should be the 27th of January, the anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz camp. Among the national institutions that complied with the indications of the Stockholm conference, was the Italian Parliament. In July 2000 a law declared the institution of the Day of Memory.
The social workers of the Albergo dei poveri, active for thirty years now with hundreds of boys from the slums that surround the building, hearing on news of the law, found that theirs was the “ideal” place to celebrate such a date. The Albergo, in fact, had been for Centuries a place of suffering, and the traces of such suffering were somehow still visible on its damaged walls and its decaying architecture. A more pertinent place to remember suffering and confinement could not be found. The children themselves could be involved, playing the role of the deported Jews in a sort of mimetic performance.
As you can see, then, a place that is just itself meets a time of remembering that is not in itself necessarily a moment of kitsch. But the two things together, through a procedure that, moving from compassion, creates identification, can easily originate a highly kitschy event. The problem, for somebody called to create an event in such a place and about such a subject, was: how, recognizing some historical analogies (the hygienic and paranoiac relation to the marginal and the different, the choice of their concentration in a separated space), to avoid a mimetic, sentimental approach without limiting oneself to a mere presentation of documents that have been seen hundreds of times.
I confess that I was more interested in the place than the subject. At that moment I was making works about the concept of shelter, refuge, hospitality and, after having built –last May, in Maastricht- a “parachute” that was meant as an exercise of unconditional hosting, I was wondering how to put the question of a shelter that would not be at the same time a prison. On the other hand, I did not want to make art “on” such an extreme subject. Such an event should be left, I thought, to its historicity and not be dealt with in terms of “art”. A form of aesthetic approach to an historical event is, though, unavoidable; even if you call it “design” or “installation”, there is a problem of setting a frame, of giving a shape to the re-presentation of catastrophe.

I came to Naples, then, with a couple of references in my head. First, an article by Gianni Vattimo called “L’impossible oubli” and published in the acts of the Royaumont symposium on Usages de l’oubli, “Usages of the oblivion” (Paris 1988). Starting from an early Nietzsche text on “the utility and damage of the history”, Vattimo points out how, in a time period that sees a “historical fever” and an excess of memory, one should recognize and extremisize such an excess, instead of taking refuge in the oblivion through religion or art as a ”unique, instantaneous, classical” work. The idea of a forgetful creation is, in fact, dependant on a “aesthetic of utopia”, which cannot be proposed anymore.
The second was a recent article by Régine Robin, “La mémoire saturée” (“The saturated memory”), published in L’inactuel in September 1998. Régine Robin is a French scholar who has been working extensively on the relationship between memory and fiction; in the text I am mentioning, for example, she states how at the liberation of the camps, some photographs were staged, as was the famous one of the US marines planting a flag on the mount Suribachi in the Iwo-Jima island. Robin’s position is that in facing the representation of the Shoah one should set spaces of meditation, rather than trying to re-create a trauma. What blocks the transmission in such official institutions as the Washington Holocaust Memorial Museum, “is the excess of images and explanations”. One should rather open a third space, a “spectral” one, that could allow both the heritage and the transmission.
Finally, a third text containing perhaps the most famous lines on the possibility of art after the Holocaust, that I will, after all, quote: “Nach Auschwitz ein Gedicht zu schreiben ist barbarisch”, “After Auschwitz to write a poem is barbarian… Through the aesthetic principle of stylization… an unimaginable fate still seems as if it had some meaning; it becomes transfigured, with something of the horror removed”; this statement, already expressed in 1949 (“Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft”) was reaffirmed by T. W. Adorno in a 1962 radio broadcast, to be published in Frankfurt in 1965 (“Engagement”, Note zur Litteratur, 2). I am not going to linger on that issue (I would rather refer you to John Felstiner’s “Translating Paul Celan’s ‘Todesfuge’: Rhythm and Repetion as Metaphor” in Saul Friedlander, ed., Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution”, Cambridge Mass. 1992, pp. 240-258), but I would like to cite a possible update of Adorno’s famous lines: in one of his last texts, the German philosopher states: «After Auschwitz… there is no word … not even a theological one, that has any right unless it underwent a transformation» (Negative Dialectics, New York 1983, p. 367). I would like to say that I took a credit from this correction, if it is one, to draw the lines of the Naples installation.

I decided that I would not build anything that would express an empathetic or emotional approach, precisely because this is the most common approach that is undertaken in dealing, in art or in educational programs, with the Shoah. And what is Kitsch, if not a form of representation that remains subordinated, forever linked, to its subject, and does not reach an autonomous form? And wasn’t the Hostel for the Poor, in its actual state of overwhelming and beautiful decadence, precisely the “ideal” place for another kitschification of the historical event of the Jewish extermination?
I decided, therefore, to leave the place in the state of abandonment in which I found it in, and to make it live again for a few hours, with sounds and short actions that, instead of just filling the space, would displace the visitor, who would find himself –if I may say so- in the presence of “absence”, faced with the recognition of loss and the fragility of the trace. An allegorical approach had to be defined, avoiding, though, the absolute distanciation that allegory can present. People should still feel that a poiesis was taking a place.
On the other hand, I thought that instead of proposing again the consolatory lullaby of the duty of memory, we should give a structure to the anamnesic work. Along with some local youngsters we entered the emptied alleys of the Albergo, where tons of archive papers, that did not appeal to the looters, laid on the floor, and found shelves and tables that we transported to the exhibition rooms and summarily repaired. We did not paint the walls but left them like they were. We just cleaned the floor and installed computers, printers, scanners, video projectors and bookshelves.
The principle of the exhibition, apart from the performances, which took place on the evening of the 27th, was a relational one. There was nothing to see, if people did not want to (most of the visitors were actually disappointed, precisely because there was, instead of a show of Holocaust art, “nothing to see”); but if people so wished, they could take and read a book, take and watch a movie, or use the computers to navigate the Internet sites devoted to the Shoah. We would offer research and educational tools instead of emotional recognition. The subject of the exhibition would not be the Jewish genocide as such, but rather the different forms of its representation in literature, music, performing arts, documentary and fiction cinema. We would set therefore the question of representability without proposing a solution, but rather present all the material that had been produced in Italy from 1945 to 2000 and leave the visitors the freedom of envisaging and utilizing this material. We were confident that the framework of the exhibition itself, whose principles seemed rather transparent, would be taken as a form of interpretation. Instead of crying to the scandal of history, we would take into account all the deposits, stratifications and works that history has presented us with.
Instead of “showing’ or “representing”, we would “project” history.

Naples 2001

Displaced Translations (2000)

The brief text that follows should be read in conjunction with the images of two works, one of which has been made (The Blue Shield, also titled Personal Monuments) and one that has been imagined but never realized (The Lifetube).
It should be taken, rather than simply a comment, as an allegorical writing referring to my activity at the Jan Van Eyck Academie and related places during the last year. This activity has been moving around the concepts of translation and transparency, their multiple relations, and the image of the artist as a translator.

I

The Blue Shield
(displaced symbols)

The language of symbols should be understood by everybody—it is assumed by the illiterate as well as the one who speaks a foreign language. This is why road signals and naval ones have been invented, along with symbolic tools, among which I am most interested in the ones that indicate the individuals or the objects that, following international conventions, should consider themselves protected.
This is the case with the Red Cross, that is universally recognized as the symbol under whose protection find place field hospitals, ambulances, stretchers, doctors and nurses.
It is a given that such places and individuals should not be involved in war—since we are supposed to have a shared respect for the wounded and to their possibility of care and recovery.

Since 1954, an analogous symbol exists for artistic monuments and the cultural patrimony in general: the Blue Shield. In 1954, a list of sites to be protected was compiled at the Hague Convention, and then improved in a second protocol in May 1999. Such a list also comprehends, beyond works of art, libraries, archives, churches, and mosques.
The most famous example of a cultural site protected by UNESCO is the old city of Dubrovnik, which was copiously bombed by the Serbs during the war in ex-Yugoslavia. It is said that Serbs were particularly interested in destroying the cultural symbols of their adversaries; on the other hand, it is also said that the Croatian army sheltered its weapons and ammunitions in the sites marked by the Blue Shield.
Consequently, the 1999 protocol corrected that of 1954, establishing the conditions under which “imperative military necessities” could justify attacks against cultural sites, regulating the behaviour of the occupying troops, and foreseeing extradition for the most serious crimes committed against the monuments.

.
The issue of the protection of monuments has always interested me. I have wanted to study the way in which, during moments of fascism (and, to be sure, under every regime that makes monuments into the icons of nationality) historical monuments are taken out of their urban context, polished up from every successive side, and made integrally visible, –since, according to Mussolini, they were meant to “gigantify in their necessary solitude.”
As we know, the war came and with it the necessity of hiding monuments from view and from the risks of bombing; they were hidden under scaffoldings, concrete and brick walls, sand bags and stuffed mattresses. For five years, from 1940 to 1945, the Italian landscape was disseminated with such mysterious and incongruous forms; the art was there, but not to be seen.
From this point of view, the 1954 Hague Convention has led to significant progress: instead of sandbags—after all, a poor means of protecting monuments from modern armaments—a simple shield painted in white and blue.

.    .    .    .    .    .    .    .    .    .

In May 2000, I was in Copenhagen, the capital of one of those northern nations in which protection is a kind of ideology; social protection, the protection of infancy, of the natural environment, of young artists. The protective role of the State there appears like the realization of the socialist ideals of the beginning of the Century, but can be so overwhelming that some artists—maybe because of their own dependence on their relationship with the institutions—wonder how such a system could be resisted (whereas in a country like Italy, where family networks and good relations occupy the role that, in the northern countries, belongs to the State, the more valid forms of resistance are—to my mind—the ones that are practised inside institutions, because those are the places of chaos).
But, as I was saying, I was in Copenhagen, having been invited to participate in a show on the theme: Models of resistance.
To put in practice my solidarity and participation I took part in the setting up of the show, transporting heavy glass plates and painting the walls of the stands. But, more than simply a labourer, which I am not, I found myself more useful –like the Italian that I am—as a cook. It was more useful for the real workers to be fed properly and to abdicate, at least for a couple of days, their frankfurters in favour of a good hot dish.

However, before the show opened, I also wanted to do my part for art. I had already spent a short period in Copenhagen five years earlier; I had lived there a brief and intense personal story. Therefore, I reproduced on adhesive plastics the symbol of the aforementioned UNESCO program, the Blue Shield, and one morning at dawn I went out, in the still deserted city, in search of the places where I had lived some events. Among these places were the Royal Theatre Opera, an antiquarian bookstore, a coffee shop, a hot-dog kiosk, a bridge, a filthy hotel. I applied twelve of these symbols on the façades or walls of these personal “places of memory.”
Once I had compiled an inventory of such work of marking and accompanied it with adequate photographic documentation, I showed it at the Overgaden gallery. A copy of the dossier, with an enclosed letter, was sent to Icomos, the international organization based in Paris that manages the Blue Shield program.
In this letter I explained how, believing that historical memory is made of an endless sum of individual knowledges and memories, I wished to add to this sum at least a part of mine, and I asked, correctly, I believe, that my memories be considered a cultural patrimony of humanity and—in case of war or any other natural catastrophe—would be protected by the Hague Convention.
I also asked about the question of “hierarchisation” in the concept of cultural heritage. Why, I asked, should the medieval cathedral be protected more than the Souvenir Shop that stands in front of it? Why, if it is true that the Souvenir Shop could not exist without the cathedral, should it be true that the cathedral would survive without its postcards? Not longing for a critical-philosophical discussion, I did not dwell further (but I would have been able to) on the matters of the original and the copy, of real art and kitsch, or popular and elite culture, et cetera.

I did not receive any answer from Icomos. On the contrary, the inhabitants of Copenhagen seem to have been more understanding. Of the twelve symbols placed alongside my personal monuments, only a few of them have been removed. It happened also that one of them was displaced and put again at a little distance, because the wall on which it stayed had to be repainted. My supposition is that they have taken the symbol for a sign of the gas pipeline, which would demonstrate the imperfection of the international system of signs.
But it would demonstrate also the creative side of the misunderstanding. In a system of signalisation—like this one experimented in the Danish capital—one that is neither logical nor systematic, the symbol is presented as a sign, but it is not the evidence of its possible prolongation: it does not have a recognizable relationship with the symbolized object, it does not indicate anything reducible to an original and reconstructible path. It rather points out an autonomous track, with, if one wishes, references to be interpreted, or, if one prefers, just read.
This would be a form of displaced translation.  Such a translation is permitted by an originary vulnerability of its subject. Generally speaking, translation is permitted by an originary transparency that carries in itself its own possibilities of translation.
Transparency goes only to one direction. One cannot make transparent something that originally is opaque, but one can multiply and open further a transparency which is already in the original object.
Transparency is perhaps the first quality of a work of art; such a work is a work of translation. If the kitsch (like we will see further on) -in its lack of distance from its object- only allows a movement between A and B and back from B to A and so on, transparency is what allows to translation its successive passages from A to B and from B to C and so on.
Such a movement of passage is doomed -clearly- to be interrupted somewhere. In the following chapter I will try to explain how one cannot give a supplementary transparency to something that has already undergone a radical transformation.

Spuglia BLUE SHIELD 03

II

The Lifetube
(displaced people)

During the entirety of the summer of 2000, as it had happened for all of 1999, thousands of illegal immigrants continued to disembark on the Italian coasts. They came mainly from the Albanian harbours, just a few hours of navigation away. They came in large inflatable boats driven by cynical sailors, who did not hesitate to throw their human load off board, if they felt sighted or pursued by the Italian coast guard.
The image of these boats and rafts could be seen everyday in the television news. Maybe these images inspired a new attitude of the demonstrators against the detention centres where the illegal immigrants were kept. Beginning in January 2000, the policemen found themselves facing crowds that demonstrated before such centres, clamouring for them to be closed down, and whose components were dressed in the following way: three or four layers of heavy sweaters, life vests, foam stuffings fixed to the shoulders with package ribbon, football pads to protect the legs, plastic helmets or pasta drippers to protect the head. Besides, the first lines of the demonstrators pushed a strange supply before them: a kind of big snake made of truck tubes bent together two by two, packed in plastic sheets and fixed to polystyrene panels, against which the clubs and the tear gas candles bounced. The name of the utensil emerged almost spontaneously: the Big Rubber (Il Gommone). (1)
Many demonstrators advanced toward the police with their arms lifted in a sign of peace. “Nobody must get hurt” was their intention. They cried out for both the right to occupy the public space and to protect themselves. They did not manifest violence, but they opposed to the violence a claim of legitimate defence.
They wore, to the letter, a life belt; the supply meant to save the life of whoever would fall into the sea became at the same time a symbolic image and tool of defence. With this simple opposition of the body, protected by an individual and a collective stuffing, the right of resistance was identified with the right to existence.
I find that this invention has a great iconic strength: an elastic matter, a rubber wall on which the kicks of the rifle can bounce and behind which bodies take refuge.
In those first occasions, the police, unprepared for this new tactic, gave up and the demonstrators, after many hours of confrontation, were admitted inside the centres of detention which they wanted to see close (namely: Milan, January 29). It is no surprise that, for the following demonstration, the police officers arrived armed with cutters.

What I will say here is perhaps a banality: a protection understood as “resistance” goes along with a recognition of brittleness and inadequacy. A total and absolute protection is not only impossible but would coincide with the suffocation of the same resistance and of its dialectics. An allegorical side is always necessary to the action of resistance, to keep such an action from both an undesirable literacy and the affirmation of a dull antagonism.
The use of the big truck tubes by the demonstrators was born by a significant image and bore a semantic shift: the device that transports the clandestine immigration becomes the symbol (and the defence tool) of whoever works against the understanding of this immigration as a crime (it should be said as well that, on an institutional level, the Italian detention centres are illegal, since immigration is not a crime contemplated by the penal code).

I think that the Big Rubber is both an art’s work and a work of art. I see such qualities not just in its practice of re-appropriation, but also in its affirmation of autonomy and of a kind of disinvestment toward its source.
If I instead lingered on the idea of making art out of the Big Rubber (or, as well, out of the immigrants’ inflatable boats), I would seriously risk falling into kitsch. My work would probably just remain a description, an allusion or an illustration. And kitsch always remains interested, involved; it always stays subordinate to its model: to the call to an original function, if it is an object; or to the intention, if it intends to be a work of art. When the intention remains translucent in the work, then the work fails. When the original is so determined in its significance, it should be left to itself.
If I would make art out of the image of this “life tube”, I would apply what, according to Gillo Dorfles (2), is the distinctive sign of the kitsch mentality, and that is the simple shift, in scale or of context, of the original work (for instance: the Eiffel tower transformed into a knickknack and standing on a television set; a Roman amphora used as a lamp; but also, I would add, the effect of an easy association: the sticker, with the name of a restaurant that casually is that of a friend, that we leave on his fridge). It is certain that -in a way or in the other- kitsch, in its work of de-contextualisation and transformation, has to do with mechanical or digital reproduction.
Does it, then, also have to do with translation? Partly, and up to a certain point. My attempt to make a work of art out of the Big Rubber would be an attempt of translation, a movement toward translation, but not a finished translation. Mine would be just an illustration, because it would not create any semantic estrangement. If it did not practise a deep alteration of the original language itself and if, together with the estrangement, it did not introduce a radical difference, the translation would be the supreme form of kitsch. (3)

It remains, however, the awareness of a contiguity between translation and kitsch. In other words: in its dependence on an original (however real or ideal that would be), in its quality of prolongation (with all the inevitable denaturalisations and misunderstandings), in its inevitable imitative character, and also in its certain monstrous character, kitsch appears like an aborted form of translation. That we practise it all day long, in a more or less wide measure and in a more or less aware way, only confirms its multi- and incomplete- form of the translation.
While kitsch represents, translation re-presents; this is why the Big Rubber is both a translation and a work of art. The forms of the translation are multiple, and they sometimes take the quality of art. This happens when, of a subject already alienated, already displaced and stolen from its world, already “kitschified”, a subject is created again—as autonomous, as a “pure sign of itself” (Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus). The loss of an acquired originality becomes, in this translation, an other originality, an other possible. This “resumption” would be the displacement of a displacement, the unveiling of a hidden originality that does not have to wait the de-kitschifying effect of the time that passes or of historical catastrophes.
I think of an other possible rescue of kitsch, one that comes from its very historical de-contextualisation; this is the case of some works that remain as testimonies of an ancient art: those that probably were provincial and imitative episodes, which a contemporary critic would have certainly considered “kitsch,” like the mural paintings of Pompei or the funeral portraits of El Fayum, and which are seen by us as mere works of art (4). The action of time has conferred on them a singularity that they did not possess and a quality that has become absolute.
It is the time that—in these cases—operates the semantic transformation of an object that becomes, according to a worn-out expression, “other from itself”; that becomes therefore projected into the world of difference, the same world that kitsch tends to ignore.

It would be difficult to deny that first postmodernism in architecture and then the artistic practices of the Eighties have led to a conceptual revaluation of kitsch, and precisely in those aspects that, in the years around World War II, were still considered to be at the best expression of aesthetic insensibility (see: Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” written in 1939) and at the worst of ethical evil (Hermann Broch, “Notes on the problem of kitsch,” lecture delivered at Yale university in 1950): the inspiration, the impression, the imitation, the reproduction, the call to the tradition.
And if there is a “sin” of kitsch, it is precisely that of supposing that a tradition exists, that there are references and models to be faithful to, that forms are endlessly multipliable, that there is a possibility of aesthetic reassurance and emotional protection.
Kitsch, which in his substitutive practice represents a continuous affirmation of loss, never lingers in mourning; even less does it mourn what is stranger. Inside it, apparently, there is space only for the familiar and the identifiable.
To mourn the stranger, to regret the one whom we will never meet, this is the opposite of kitsch: it means to perform an act of recognition and to go beyond the recognition, to perform an act of memory and to go beyond the memory, to depart from the tradition without adopting a borrowed one, to remain in the kingdom of the possible.

From the other “sin” of kitsch, the one stigmatised by Broch and recalled in the Eighties by authors like Lyotard and Vattimo (5) -that is, the tension toward the beautiful- contemporary art has somehow saved us. To tell to an artist that his work is beautiful is today a way of insulting him. And the reason for this is the fact that today’s art does not intend to make “work” but, rather, “to make world” (6).
And here is where the Big Rubber returns, and the fact that it is a matter of art, an “art’s work”. This status is given to it precisely by the abdication of the art to its iconicity and to its uniqueness. Art is not a gesture, but rather a repeated gesture. And the repetition, as Aristotle once said, “gives birth to a nature.”

gommone-tutebianche

(1) For an accurate description of this demonstrative tool  see: Ludovic Prieur, Brigitte Tijou, ”Il Gommone. Un dispositif de désobéissance civile”, Vacarme, n. 12,

(2) See his introduction to: Kitsch. An Anthology of Bad Taste, New York, 1969.

(3)   “The translator is a writer of a rare singularity, precisely where he seems not to claim any. He is the secret master of the difference of languages, not to abolish it, but to use it…” Maurice Blanchot  “Sulla traduzione”, Aut Aut, n. 189-190, Milano 1982, pp. 98-101 (Originally: “Reprises”, Nouvelle Revue Française, n. 93, Paris 1960).

(4)   I find this example in Hermann Broch, “Das Böse im Wertsystem der Kunst”, Schriften zur Literatur, vol. II, Frankfurt am Main 1975 (first published in Die Neue Rundschau, August 1933), p. 155.

(5)   “.. that to make beautiful art today is to make kitsch; that even authenticity is precluded… “, Jean-François Lyotard, Heidegger and “the jews”, Minneapolis-London 1997 (Paris 1988), p. 45.

(6)  See Gianni Vattimo, “L’impossible oubli”, in Usages de l’oubli, Paris 1988, pp. 77-89.

Digressions of the Resistance (2000)

1.
At this moment I am in the vanguard.
The letters that had to be written have been written, the housework is done, I have only to concentrate on my subject. I have only one aim and it is before me: I‘ve got to start and reach the conclusion of a text on the notion of resistance.
The field is clear, unobstructed; only the open landscape is before me. I am the vanguard of myself.
I am followed at the distance of a few centimetres –twenty, maybe- by the rearguard of myself. I cannot go without it. Only a thickness of flesh separates that part of me which is in an advanced position from what simply follows. These few centimetres make a significant difference.
I remember that, in the war-stories that I read as a teenager, being shot in the back was the greatest dishonour: it meant that one was fleeing the enemy. Similarly the traitor was condemned to be shot in the back. And in fascist propaganda, the partisan was represented in the gesture of stabbing in the darkness and in the back.
But the opposing rethorics of collaboration and resistance1 as well as those of vanguard and rearguard seem today emptied of their original meaning. This is precisely because the signs of a frontal opposition aren’t visible anymore. It is the very thinness of the sheet, its third dimension between recto and verso that seems enormously enlarged. It remains, though, only conceptually visible.
If resistance looks today like an almost decayed notion, this is because we experience a fragmentation and dispersion of social rules; we all work, in the western societies, a similar matter, we mould the same clay. How can you resist the one who pays you? How can an artist resist those who grant him his living?
But, without comparing welfare societies to the Nazi invader (what Paul Virilio does, in relation to technological progress)2, it’s unavoidable to see how the space between collaboration and resistance is at the same time conceptually enormous and physically thin, like a line that we cross ten times a day.
The reason is partially in the very notion of resistance. Resistance –here the example of World War II, if extreme, is also eloquent- is to move by definition in the same space as the adversary, to share the same physical space and similar symbolic weapons (“taken from the enemy”)3. “All resistance is ambiguous, as its name indicates”4; it implies participation in an imposed system, an understanding of the adversary’s mentality, a constant sequence of compromises, a guerrilla war where there are no frontal attacks or defences but instead displacements, deviations, encirclings, ambushes.
In this regard resistance appears to be a disturbance activity, comparable to that of a guard that operates in the rear to slow the enemy’s advance. The meaning of rearguard lies in this après-coup: in action that follows observation and reflection, in reaction to a stimulation or an attack (or an excitation like the Freudian Reiz). This is where rearguard seems to be in a more interesting position than vanguard; to be in the vanguard is –for an artist- pure creation, advancing in an unexplored land, researching new formal fields. But technology will always be faster than any artistic avant-garde; to rush after it doesn’t make much sense. Maybe today’s artistic avant-garde are the creators of computer programs, and the artists who use such programs are a mere para-avant-garde.
I find it more interesting to linger in the space of the “just passed” than to run after a passing fashion, or to be a fashion. This attitude of attention and reflection defines the rearguard. To this attitude corresponds a predilection for those moments in history just after the event: a stasis in time that prefigures the knowledge that nothing will be the same as “before”, even as we are still present in the echo of this very “before”.

2.
Slowing down and disturbing the enemy’s action are duties common to rearguard and resistance. If we wish to consider the artist as a resister, we need to indicate his enemy. Once the artist was a client of a noble man or a confraternity; then he became an entrepreneur in a world of entrepreneurs; he is today an application-form filler and a grant-dependent; such grants are given by institutions. Is the institution the artist’s enemy?
Artists exist to disturb; this is their most widely accepted function5; this is why the relationship between artist and institution can only be based on misunderstanding; constant misunderstanding, mutual exploitation, space sharing, interchangeability of roles: there is no alternative to such an intercourse when we see how even art which has institutional critique at its core is re-absorbed in the institution. The interlacing is such, actually, that every artist is as institutional as a museum director, and every museum director as oppositional as an artist6. This is a relatively recent phenomenon; a post-68 effect, I would say.
The institution needs its opposite: in its constant work of self-legitimisation it needs people who disturb; it needs, particularly, to select and protect those who disturb with aesthetic, not aimless or chaotic means. In this regard art is a form of re-composition; it is not by chance that we have art-therapy, along with horse-therapy; it is not by chance that graffiti and rap music are preferable to riots and broken-in shop windows, and find, therefore, broad ways of distribution and support, both institutional and commercial7.
But to see things from another point of view, how does one loosen the contradiction of carrying on resistance towards what one materially depends on: ministries of culture, foundations, academies, collectors, galleries, museums?
Most artists resolve it by competing in the same space and under the same conditions, that are given to the artistic scene: which means making war to each other. Why not? Why not make, also, war with each other; why not make contacts and create a network of relations and alliances and seek protection? But the error would be, I think, to lose one’s autonomy, to identify oneself as a participant in a “scene”, moving one’s pawns on a chessboard already sketched.
The only form of artistic resistance I can imagine today is this one of dis-institutionalising it, taking part in other spaces of discourse and relation that cannot be defined as art specific. Like political utopia, resistance no longer has its traditional place; it must constantly occupy new places.

3.
I will remain in an allegorical mode, recalling my personal experience of heterotopia. It was around the first months of 1977 in Italy. The era of the post-68 “institutional” leftist groups was over, but it wasn’t yet the moment when the groups organised in the Autonomia8 would kidnap a mass movement that still existed, still searched for new forms of presence. Already, in the winter of 1976-1977, there were those who broke into expensive shops to “expropriate” not bread but smoked salmon and caviar, demonstrating their subordination to the clichés of bourgeois luxury. Meanwhile there was still a great desire for a new conviviality in new spaces. In these months many condemned buildings in the city centres were occupied by groups of young leftists or low-income families.
At that time people also went out to demonstrate for cheaper cinema tickets. In retrospect this seems a ridiculous demand; it is ridiculous to think of invading public squares and streets just to pay a few liras less to see a Hollywood movie in a cinema hall belonging to a multinational, in the almost complete lack of alternative spaces. But the alternative space, in those days, were the same streets and squares; you would arrange an appointment with a few individuals, you would go there some days later. Finding yourself surrounded by dozens, you would start walking and would have ten thousand behind you. We would go from one movie theatre to the next; a delegation would go in, turn the lights on, make a short speech to the audience, go back to the waiting crowd, move on.
All that did not, strictly speaking, make any sense. Or, rather, the sense of all that was: I) to constitute a community, absolutely imaginary, utopian if you wish, lacking its own office and its own scene, doomed to appropriate only momentarily a set of public spaces meant for a different use: the squares, the streets, the movie theatres; II) through a pretentious and oblique objective (nobody was really interested, not even for free, in watching an Italian B-movie or an American comedy) to show the existence of a public authority and a resistance to this authority, and to do it in ways that were not necessarily those of a confrontation between workers and capitalist in the factory. It showed that resistance can inhere in claiming a simple pleasure, a simple right to choose that has been taken away.
The aim was not directly to change society or to express an individual right. It was to claim as “public” the entertainment spaces; to take entertainment out of its private sphere and confound the boundaries between entertainment, pleasure and public right. To claim a right to the spectacle without really caring about the spectacle, was a way of widening the boundaries of the political itself; it was a way of demonstrating the existence of a collective presence that, by avoiding being targeted as an organic “political” counterpart, also eluded politics as a matter of professionalism and seriousness. In such a situation you are not there “as” an artist or “as” a worker, you are not representing yourself if not in the part of yourself which, in that particular moment, is claiming a particular collective right, temporarily occupying and transforming a public space.
This is why I can only believe in necessarily temporary and provisional places, places that would be made “other”, places of exchange, encounter and exposition. Places that would be designated as such and that are by definition open, but not outside the relation. I was once in a squat in Rome when somebody who wasn’t known to us arrived, asking for hospitality: “All right, but let us know each other”, he was told.
Was that a new form of public space? I think it was, precisely because of its being a temporary place. In fact those occupied houses were somebody’s property, and sooner or later the police would come to evacuate them (like it happens today to the Centri sociali in Italy). A space that would be both public and alternative can only be temporary. It is in its being “possible” and “passed” at the same time that it finds its meaning: container of an imaginary community and receptacle of a community that would have been possible; of a community that exists only in the tension toward it, only in the longing for what it could have been but has not and cannot be.
Reinventing places; re-naming them, catching sight of other, hypothetical uses of a space; practising a diverting of signs; confounding one’s artistic gesture with the scattered gestures of urban communication; diluting, dissipating, spreading the gesture; leaving signs that may or may not be seen, that may or may not be “artistic”9; eluding but not refusing the official sites of communication and exposition: maybe, they are possible models of resistance. I will linger on that further on.
Another way of resisting could be to renounce a constant artist’s attitude, a wishful being always and everywhere an artist. I think of a paradigmatic situation: two painters who were living in the same city occupied by the enemy in wartime; one, Picasso, doesn’t stop painting and receiving visitors in his studio; the other, van Velde, who survives thanks to the charity canteen, doesn’t touch the paintbrush for five years. When asked about the reason of his inactivity he can only answer that one cannot work when such things happen around him 10. This seems to me an implicit criticism of “engaged” art: when such things happen you might rather stop underlining them with your artistic signature, wishing to be “helpful”, and simply take a practical form of commitment to the state of emergency you are living in. You will maybe help to create a time, later on, for the “peinture d’histoire”, or art of history, which politicises art.11

4.
Let us go back to the resistance. I think after this digression that it could be defined as a movement of reaction, response and retaliation that shares the physical and linguistic space of its adversary; meanwhile it creates, in this same space, its own places and idioms. It creates a space of the rear, a maquis which has a scale and forms of diffusion different from the dominant ones. I think of all the graphic media, more or less skilful, more or less improvised but always necessarily autonomous, invented by the Resistance: fake documents, leaflets, newsletters, hand-printed newspapers, graffiti12; they can be compared, in another context, to the fanzines, the privately printed poems, and the photocopied magazines of the pre-internet era (it would be interesting to compile a collection of such means of communication, from Mexican Calaveras to Russian “Music on bones”13).
In retrospect it is evident that the “privately printed” was anything but a mere expression of a private sphere; since it was dependent on manual technique and materials, it implied a sequence of personal interconnections that the internet eludes, and was grounded in a “hand to hand” distribution; there was though, in this limitation of scale, the idea of a circulation both hazardous and personal, but always locally, topographically rooted. The one who today has a website speaks to everybody and to nobody; he stays finally in the representation of himself. This form of communication is often without any object other than the communication itself; in that sense it creates an illusory community. Distances are not abolished by the internet because nothing can replace physical presence, contact and touch (saying that, I do not fail to recognise the role the internet and mobile phones have played in organising resistance to Haider’s party in Austria).
If the internet seems to be above all an open and common space, this is because resisters, dominators and collaborators all navigate it and this is where the roles are most easily and rapidly interchangeable. This is the syntopia we live in. In such a context we can say that every resister is part collaborator and every collaborator part resister. In that sense our turn of the century cannot be compared to World War II. But I cannot resist trying a last allegory.
If an “above” and an “under” on the power ladder still exist, the variations and intersections of it are infinite, even in the most oppressive situations.
In reading Robert Antelme’s work on deportation14, we follow the multiple variations of signs that progressively differentiate the prisoners’ body, differentiating them from top to bottom in relationship to those who exercise over them the power of life and death. This articulation is both an instrument of domination and an affirmation of singularities that escape this domination.15
In such a differentiation new dominators and new resisters were created; in the multiplication of levels of power originated a chaos that was above all a further form of oppression to which the resisters opposed a struggle for legality.
Force is something that has variable and diverse intensities; the colour of force is also subject to variability; the mastering of language for example is a force whose colour varies. Several times in the only book he wrote, Antelme analyses the crucial role of translation16. The translator’s power can in such extreme situations either contribute to growing chaos or to affirming legality. Legality seen in such situation, is situated in the diversion of law17; the one who defends it doesn’t hear, hears badly, “turns a deaf ear”, cultivates the misunderstanding in the vertical transmission of control. In translating in “his own way” the translator has the power to enlarge or to narrow the spaces for communication and survival. His work of resistance is, therefore, an “art’s work”.
In an infinitely less oppressive reality like our western societies, the power of translation is that of a re-appropriation of official language, and of its misappropriation which consists in differently pointing out the places of social exchange. Resistance could be simply in a different name: an unused building becomes a “Squat”; a photocopied paper is a “Journal”; a private collection is made a “Museum”.
Resistance for an artist might be in dis-identifying with prevailing notions of artistic identity; in refusing for example to be “professional”. I am aware that such a position can be considered a residual “avant-gardism” or a form of voluntarism; but I doubt that models of resistance can be indicated without such voluntarism.

5.
Before World War II, when it wasn’t taken as a physical quality of matters, by resistance one understood only “resistance to authority”, punished by article 337 of the Italian penal code and equivalent to the crime of “public violence” (art. 336). According to the law, only a private person could be guilty of such a crime: in opposing representatives of the State he would place himself outside the law and the public sphere.
With the war and the consequent opposition to German occupation in Europe (and Nazi domination in Germany) there was both an enlargement and a diversion of this notion. Those who “resisted” opposed a different concept of legality and a different idea of public representation. This is why fascists had to find another signifier that would symbolically exclude them: partisans could be named, on the radio and in the newspapers, only as “bandits” (etymologically: banished, exiled, outlaws).
These fluctuations in the meaning of words are paradigmatic: in the second half of the XIX century a resister was somebody who, by definition, was against progress; in the second half of the XX century a State like the Italian republic finds its legitimacy in the Resistance as a constitutive value.18
This is why today nobody would refuse to call himself a “resister”. Maybe the most difficult thing remains to indicate what, in every different situation, we intend to resist.

Spring 2000

Thanks to Robert Garnett and Vania Del Borgo

Emergency of the Proxenos (2000)

1.Asylum
On the 21st of April 753 BC. Romulus drew with a plough the furrow that would delimit and ground the city of Rome. The walls of the town were raised along the lines of the furrow. The line demarcated an inviolable space; Remus, Romulus’ twin brother, jumped over it as a challenge and was immediately killed.
In the places where Romulus had lifted the plough -interrupting the continuity of the line- the doors of the city were set; through these openings things -both pure and impure- were allowed to pass. Once this rite was accomplished Romulus declared: “Mundus patet”: the world is open.
This happened on the Palatine hill. Under the same circumstances, an asylum was created in a holy thicket by the Capitol. Ancient historians say that this area was created in order to gather all those isolated and disbanded men who could contribute to the demographic growth of Rome.
But the presence of such a safe haven -where pursued criminals, fugitive slaves, outlaws of every kind could find shelter without being questioned about their origin or past- was a common fact in ancient times. It is documented by the Greeks, the Jews, the Germans.
The asylum was a holy place, within whose borders dogs did not hunt their prey and wolves lived in peace and good harmony with deer. At the origin of such a belief was the conviction that the sanctity of a place (or an object) would be communicated by contact.
Whoever would have put his hands on a fugitive inside such a space would have committed a sacrilegious gesture. It is told how, in 7th or 6th Century Athens, the survivors of Cylon’s conspiracy found shelter in Athena’s temple. Eventually deciding to leave the shelter they unrolled a thread that kept them in contact with the goddess’s statue; but the thread -by accident or malignity, we don’t know- broke and the conspirators were slaughtered.
The right of asylum’s main function seems to have been the mitigating of such a bloody revenge. This institution offered -to the murderer who flew from his victim’s relatives or to the slave who escaped his master’s mistreatments- a reconsideration of his case, or at least a delayed punishment.

2. Hospitium

By hospitium (for the Greeks: xenia) Latin meant the ensemble of rituals that ruled the relations between two foreigners who would make a pact. Such relations of mutual obligation and courtesy drew, before the foundation of stronger state-controlled institutions, a generalised net of alliances. Those who would participate in them were all of a similarly superior social status. The Oxford Classical Dictionary states that ”Throughout antiquity, such people lent each other powerful support, often at the expenses of their inferiors, so frequently that ritualised friendship may justly be regarded as a tool for perpetuating class distinction”.
Among the hospites, obligations were those of mutual reception and assistance, as well as of standing godfather to each other’s sons.
An object, the symbolon, indicated the effectiveness of such a friendship. Made out of bronze or clay, bearing a few words written on it, it was often a plaque broken into two correspondent parts. It functioned also as an identification that would protect the traveller in foreign territories.
There was an institution -particularly in Greece- that introduced this private pact between strangers into the public domain: proxeny.
Proxenia was a contract between a State and the citizen of a polis. The latter, chosen among the most influential and wealthy personalities of his city, was a sort of godfather of a foreign State and its citizens. He would welcome, at his own expense, the travellers or the ambassadors who would arrive from the other country; he would sponsor them and represent them in the circumstances of religious ceremonies and commercial intercourses. In exchange, he would benefit of honours and privileges, mostly symbolical, from the nation with which he would have signed the pact. Being a citizen of the State in which he served, and not of the State he represented, more than an official he was considered a benefactor.
The title of proxenos (pro-xenos: the one who receives the stranger) was lifelong and hereditary, as was the private relation between the xenoi we mentioned before.
As a “public host” -and surely because of his proved capacities of mediation- the proxenos was often called to arbitrate in conflicts between rival cities or parties.

3. Proxenia

From these brief notes, we can see how large the difference between asylum and hospitium is. If we intend to respect the meaning of these words in their use today, we should not speak indifferently of shelter and hospitality. Because, if the latter is a fact of alliances and expresses relations of power (the politics), the first is designed by forms of sovereignty which decide matters of life and death (the political).
There is a sort of asylia, though, whose borders overlap with the practice of hospitality: this is the privilege given to individuals rather than to places. The stranger who would have been declared asylos could consider himself safe from hostility or vexations, even in a state of war with the country to which he belonged. Ambassadors -for instance- were protected by the asylia, as were athletes going to Olympia and some categories of workers. We would like today’s refugees to be considered messengers -which they are- and to be sheltered because of this.
We would like, on the other end, to take a figure of hospitium and move it into the field of asylum. Why couldn’t it be a guarantor and representative of the State of the fugitives and supplicants? Why couldn’t it be somebody who -without being an official- would be implicitly recognised by both sides as a mediator?
In regard to the right of asylum the State is not an arbitrator but a party, precisely because refugees are foreigners. In some sense, it is not its task to welcome the stranger; this is the task of the citizens, either in association or as individuals. A more formal recognition of such figures of mediation and tutelage would not bring about any harm.

2000

Translator’s scratching (2000)

I

In his last book, The drowned and the saved, Primo Levi tells how, in occasion of the German edition of If this is a man, he had to face a problem regarding its translation.
Gounan, a French Jew of Polish origin, addressed Kraus, an Hungarian, with an expression that sounded strange and unacceptable to the German translator: “Langsam, du blöder Einer, langsam, verstanden?”. Primo Levi, who had written down the sentence as he thought he had heard it, after a long correspondence with the translator accepted his suggestion: “Langsam, du blöder Heini, …”, Heini being the diminutive of Heinrich.
Only twenty years later, whilst reading a book on Yiddish language, Levi found out that an expression such as: “Khamoyer du eyner!”, “Dunce you one!” existed in that language. “Mechanical memory had functioned correctly”, comments the writer.
In 1959 the Fischer Bücherei publisher had bought the copyright for the German translation of Levi’s book on Auschwitz (which first came out in 1947, although it was widely read only in the 1958 Einaudi’s edition). Levi expressed a feeling of triumph which helped him to understand “the true public” he had in mind when he wrote Se questo e`un uomo. Written in Italian and for Italian readers the book was actually addressed to “those” against whom it was aimed like a gun.
“Now the gun was loaded”, and Levi was ready to supervise closely the German publisher and his translator’s work. He demands a constant check over the editorial process and warns them not to change a single word of his original text: “I wanted to check on not merely its lexical but also its inner faithfulness ”3. It was only on receiving a long letter from the translator that he decided that he could trust him; deserting the Nazi army in September 1943, Heinz Riedt (strangely enough never mentioned by Levi) joined the Italian partisan troops and fought against his fellow-countrymen. Having settled in Berlin after the war, he made a living as a translator, because of his love for independence and because it was difficult to find a job as a deserter; as an Italianist, Riedt was an expert in Veneto dialects, the region where he had fought with the partisans. For him translating If this is a man was a way to continue his political battle4. There was no reason to be suspicious of his political opinions, but there was still the linguistic suspicion.
Levi’s German, learned first from chemical treatises and then in concentration camps, was a primitive and a brutalised language, a “degenerated jargon” which had been a mere and essential means of survival (more than once Levi tells how he owed his life to his timely intuition of the necessity of translation, when during his first days at Auschwitz, he exchanged bread for language lessons); on the other end, Riedt being “a man of letters and refined education”, ignored the linguistic peculiarities of the German spoken in the concentration camp, which only partly came from the barrack-room language.
As we already have seen, the linguistic alienation was to be found not only between different national languages but also within the same language, precisely in its varieties: besides ignoring the concentration camp variety of the Lingua Tertii Imperii, the translator also ignored a German dialect as Yiddish.
The cooperation between author and translator was long and wearing: both perfectionists, they spent months in exchanging letters with linguistic suggestions and objections.
“The pattern was general: I indicated a thesis to him, the one suggested to me by the acoustic memory to which I referred before; he presented me with an antithesis, ‘this is not good German, today’s readers would not understand it’; I retorted that ‘down there we said exactly this’; finally we arrived at the synthesis, that is, a compromise. Experience then taught me that translation and compromise are synonymous… ”5.
This statement seems to me full of Levi’s usual secular wisdom, which is likely to have saved his life. We can agree with his Hegelian schematism only if we assume the translation is a means of crossing-over, a thin bridge across two different languages. I think, all the same, that in a couple of passages Levi perhaps unconsciously leaves an open way, at least on one side, to his synthesis; he offers therefore a footbridge leading to a path that I would like to follow.
I would like to draw attention to two issues. The first one lies in the specificity of this translation: this book, written in Italian, actually ‘takes place’ in German; its primary language, so to speak, is German – moreover, the German spoken in concentration camps – a language foreign even to the German intellectuals about whom Améry speaks; only reluctantly did they succeed, if they succeeded at all, in pronouncing it6. All the same, the concept of authenticity and originality remains essential to Levi: “In a certain sense, it was not a matter of translation but rather of a restoration: his [translator’s] was, or wanted to be, a restitutio in pristinum, a retroversion to the language in which events had taken place and to which they belonged. More than a book, it should be a tape recording”7. According to Levi it had to be voice, sound, as if recording it was the fittest way to get close to the experience itself. Levi considered himself an ear-witness (remember in the page above his statement about the accuracy of his acoustic memory); but there is more here, when he says that in translation he looks for a “retroversion”, a return to the event that cannot otherwise be represented. A book becomes a paper object after many following passages, an object whose nature is too far from the event that originated it. He didn’t want his book to be a movie, neither an editing nor a sequence of images, it had to be a tape recording. It was through that method of technical reproduction that it was possible to be most faithful. When Levi talks of his own automatic memory he means it as a non-subjective instrument, almost independent from his self and surely more reliable than his own will to bear witness. The only way of representing the experience would be to reproduce it, and this is clearly impossible; not even a mechanical recording is available and there is no choice but to be the first translator – in the most accessible language, the written one – of the sounds recorded by memory.
This remind us how the need to ‘go back’ to a language in which Levi did not write contradicts the concept of translation as a process of conveying linguistic matter, a process that need a “compromise”. Levi is aware that this is not a matter of a mere conveyance, as is suggested by the Italian word traduzione, which is the word used to describe the transfer of a prisoner from one jail to another, or by tradotta, which refers to the train that carries the troops in wartime.
The second issue regarding Levi’s text to which I would like to draw attention, arises from the passage in which he quotes the letter he wrote to the German translator, in May 1960, to thank him for his work; here we find a contradiction also with the idea of “retroversion” to the original. Levi adopts another medical expression in the letter: “You understand, it is the only book I have written, and now that we are finished transplanting it into German… ”8. In “transplanting” there is everything but the parallelism of a simple linguistic conveyance. It suggests instead something related with surgery, to the graft of an alien organ in one’s body; it is impossible not to think of a transplant without imagining a traumatic and dangerous operation that always threatens rejection. This book is a “loaded gun”, of course, and Levi wants it to be an explosive for the soul of his German readers, and, significantly, through the exact reproduction of a language that used Fressen (to devour) instead of Essen (to eat), Stücke (pieces) instead of Männern (men) or Leiche (corpses). But to transplant a text that is by definition foreigner in the body of a language implies that this language will undergo a mutation, and contributes towards its transformation into something different. Here again we are distant from the idea of translation as inevitable compromise. The intruder forces the bounds of the language, although Levi declared that he was only interested in “making my voice heard to the Germans”.
The subversive side of the transplant lies precisely in the fact that, starting from unavoidable compatibilities – such as the blood group of the donor and host – it introduces a ‘specific’ human factor where certain differences no longer matter: not only those of ‘facies’, but also the most radical: race and gender. Once its immunological defences have been lowered, for example, an European male body might accept an African woman’s heart9.
To pursue the same metaphor, let’s say that compatibilities are themselves the linguistic boundaries of translatability, since they allow the intrusion of an alien organ, without being assimilated, to ‘combine’ within the hosting body, testing its limits and endangering the body itself. This is perhaps what Primo Levi’s translator has realised – an application of what Benjamin said was the task of the translator: to widen up, that is, the borders of his own language. To “restore” the language in which the things had happened, that was simply impossible: Levi’s book was not a recording, but an art work. It could be translated only into another work of art; it could be only mutated.

II

Die wahre Übersetzung ist durchscheinend. “A real translation is transparent; it does not cover the original, does not block its light, but allows the pure language, as though reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon the original all the more fully”10.
How can a translation be transparent?
As we have seen it in Primo Levi’s case, written language is, by itself, a translation. It is, therefore, the means for expressing the necessary testimony; it is a mediation that is there in order to represent the authenticity of the experience.
If transparency can be a translation’s attribute, it also belongs to the process of mediation. Transparency does not render an object visible, it allows instead its visibility. As a medium, it puts two terms into relationship. But it is not synonymous with fidelity to one of the two; it is not reproduction. On the contrary, a concept of deformation, or contamination, is always present in the idea of transparency. The transparent matter is not looked at, because it is looked through. Still, it is there, and the vision or the sensation cannot not to be modified. In computer science, the expression “transparent for the customer” indicates an operation that, while it is carried out, is unknown to him, is not made perceivable. What one sees is only the effect. Something that is looked at in transparency is something that can be only seen “transversally”.
On the other end, especially in the Anglo-Saxon languages, transparency can imply the superimposition of various elements, whether they are matters, signs, or tracings; this superimposition gives place to interlacings that are by definition modifications of matters, signs and original tracings, and a variety of elements that arrange themselves together. Understood in such a way, transparency appears therefore in contradiction with the idea of visibility. From the coexistence of disparate texts – that are, in a certain sense, mutilated and reduced to traces – emerges a new matter, initially obscure both to the sight and to its legibility. It can be said that it is in a certain ‘covering’ that the transparency discovers its possibilities. These possibilities are given, more than from a linguistically common ‘light’, from the superimpositions between the edges of the dissimilar elements. The vanishing of the margins in the interlacing of the texts, the tangling of the distinguished shapes, is what opens to a new shape.
If there is a metaphor for this concept of transparency, it is that of mixing. In music, mixing is technically the recording on a single band of elements, sounds (instrumental, vocal) previously recorded, pertaining to the same piece. But with hip-hop and, then, techno music, mixing has become, in a expansion and upheaval of sense, the form of a text opened to the infinite, and not limited by linear time or by choice in the sampling.
The DJ, the craftsman of this process, has a position that does not coincide with that of the author: the aesthetic material exists already, and it is a matter of combining it together: to choose citations, sequences, times, caesuras, layerings. About a DJ we often only know the pseudonym, and we nearly never see his face. The trace of his work remains nearly always anonymous, deprived of copyright. It seems to me that these are all analogies with the figure of the translator, and in particular with that one of a “transparent” one, the one who, without being seen, lets others see through himself. It could be said, though, that a translator is a DJ without a public: this one, instead of assisting in the performance of the mixing, will only enjoy the finished product.
Since what is transparent is what lets itself be passed through: a matter penetrated by light, that lets what is beyond be seen; a body transpierced by x- rays, that reveals, in signs that should all be deciphered, what is within. This condition of the passing through is therefore a form of resistance; in both a literal sense and a symbolic one, the transparent body is an obstacle.
What appears is something that is behind, under or within a body, it is not the body itself, which remains by definition hidden to the type of sight, or experience, that allows; at the same time it is perceivable, instead, to the type of sight or experience to which it is an obstacle (the hardness of the glass, the surface of the human body). A transparent translation therefore would be an invisible one, that, instead of projecting its shadow on its subject, opens, in the combinations of new texts, the readings that, already in the original language, were contained in the latent state.
Let’s go back to musical metaphors. The interpreter (a word that in Latin indicated the broker, the intermediary of cattle or real estate) is the one who, possessing anything but his qualities of interpretation, unfold, untangle, carries out, resolves a material with which he has been entrusted. Whether this material becomes a work of art or, instead, mere communication, depends on the quality of his performance.
In a dialogue about techno music11, Jean-Luc Nancy seems to establish a difference of quality between a work that would be a mere overlapping of various musical elements, a kind of collage, able only to express the instability, the aging of a given shape, and, on the other hand, a mixing able to produce, beginning from heterogeneous identities, a new form. In doing so, he widens the concept of mixing to its extremes, by conceiving the form as something that is both permanent and changing: “This can require a long time, in the same way that the various Latin languages – such as French, Spanish, Rumanian and Italian – spring forth from long operations of the decomposition of Latin, by mixing with other languages, in processes that have taken centuries. Then the forms appear…What I mean to say is that it exists a true issue of the form, as well as it exists a true issue of the work. Not for mere taste of the forms, not in order to say: ‘we need a new form’, but because, in spite of everything, the form, it can be said in the style of Nietzsche, is also what protects us from the abyss of the bottom, from the ‘bottomless bottom’”12.
The new form is a form of the translation. It offers a larger conception than the one of interpretation; differently from this one, that remains a prolongation of its subject, the translational practice catches from its subject the elements of a form that escapes recognizability.
The last page of Benjamin’s text reminds me of the image of the abyss. There, regarding Hölderlin’s translations of Sophokles, it is said as “in them meaning plunges from abyss to abyss until it threatens to become lost in the bottomless dephts of language”13. And about this same subject that George Steiner speaks, in Antigones, of translation in terms of appropriation and metamorphosis14.
Appropriation and metamorphosis are attributes of the mixing: a question of choosing pre-existent pieces (and it would be worth here to open the issue of the criteria of choice and sampling), subtracting them from their context, superimposing them to other pieces equally reduced to fragments, decomposing them in limbs, recomposing the scattered limbs in other temporary orders, changing their lenght, their volume, their sonorous mass . In this practice, that can be called of ‘re-presentation’, what is represented is the loss of originality and autonomy of a work that is reduced to objectify to manipulate, to produce a simulacrum of itself.
It can be said that it is precisely in the lack of respect for the original that lies the conditions of the metamorphosis. This is the case in Hölderlin’s translations, in which the understanding of the original text is not necessarily the key to the great level of transfiguration caught up by the German poet. It can happen that a grammatical error, occurring “out of ignorance, carelessness, or haste”15 leads to luminous linguistic solutions. In this respect, translation is not less metamorphic than mixing. In such a re-presentation we find an other originality, an other authenticity. Similarly, the repeated and multiple alienation of a work appears like a refounding, a restitution or a “retroversion, to use Primo Levi’s word, to an original previous to the work itself, to a field of the possible.
This movement towards the past, a movement of “resumption”, is particularly obvious in hip-hop music, but also in an other of its characters, the anachronism. In the moment in which the digital technique, in the mid-eighties, has produced the laser-discs that have quickly occupied the musical market, rendering the vinyls obsolete as instruments of reproduction, these have been resumed like mere sonorous material, like primary matter of ephemeral and changing works. The vinyl recording is exalted exactly because of its defects, such as its submission to the impression of the needle; the same disused character of the instrument, that now return as a kind of ‘gramophone’, becomes a quality. The scratching technique – surely related to that of contemporary graffiti16 – expresses acoustically, with its tremblings, its stoppings, its creakings, its accelerated or slowed down tempos, this movement of contrattempo.
The transparency, understood as stratification and compenetration, is the method itself of this graphical music. The Italian graffio indicates, in a nearly etymological way, its expressive instrument. The analogy with graffiti, in particular with prehistoric ones, is obvious: there, too, the images’ outlines were overlap, coexist simultaneously, not hidden but interlaced with others, in drawings made of tiny details or lines summarily traced17.
What in mixing seems inaccessible or difficult to perception is the very identity of the original material. Its recognizability is that of the single elements that emerge – by choice or by chance – from the new form that adopts them.
These recognizable elements appear isolated from what they previously had around them and are introduced like autonomous texts. Their relationship with the contiguous elements is an aesthetic intensification of the ‘appoggiatura’: an element leans over the subsequent one, occupying a part of its duration or its space. In classical music the ‘appoggiatura’ was an embellishment, in which a note was enhanced by the one that preceded it, at a particular interval, superior or inferior. The mixing is articulated in the resumption and manipulation of this interval.
In the interstices of the superimpositions between the notes (or the propositions, or the images) lies the difficulty of perception. In this is the interest about transparency; it resides in its relationship with the ‘ill-visible’; in the effort that we demand of the senses and in the relinquishments of sight and hearing is the key of a knowledge that is neither immediate nor intentional. This also concerns another type of mixing, such as the one between different linguistic structures: writing and the image. Whilst leaning over to the others, superimposing themselves while remaining distinct, the various elements enable both the distance-taking from themselves and of the others from themselves. This is the case of every kind of written text, whether descriptive or not, supported by or to an image. Put simply, they cannot be read together18.
Some inadequacy of the senses, the impossibility of picking, seizing, selecting, accompanies a work that goes in the sense of complexity rather than in that of simplification. This complexity has the figure of a stratigraphy, whose members are not discernible on first sight. An ulterior mediation of sight and a deepened time of listening become necessary.
The penetrability of such a work, whether visual, literary, or musical, demands an analogous attitude from the spectator, the reader, the listener; it is not a matter of ‘focusing’ on a subject, or of a diffused brightening up of perception; rather it is a matter of the variable intensity of the attention, of the interruptions and intervals of the presence, of revealing distractions, of discontinuous listenings, of the shiftings of sight, of slanting and oblique looks. As we have seen, transparency is what ensures that things only appear ‘crosswise’.

III

“It is this reflective sorrow I now propose to draw out and render visible, so far as that is possible, in some pictures. I call them ‘shadowgraphs’, partly to remind the reader by the very designation that I am summoning them from the dark side of life, partly because, just like shadowgraphs, they are not visible straightaway. If I take a shadowgraph in my hand, I gain no impression from it, can form no real idea of it; it is only when I hold it up to the wall and look not at the immediate image but at what appears on the wall, it is only then that I see it”19.
In order to follow up with this image, it is necessary to remember that the literal translation of the Danish skyggerids would be rather ‘shadowy contour’ or, even better, ‘patterns of shadows’. It is indeed necessary to know that the silhouettes about which Kierkegaard writes were not only the cut out profiles of black paper then glued on a white sheet, especially fashionable during the second half of the eighteenth century. The image, then, could have been cut out or perforated on paper. What was looked at was therefore the projection, on the wall or on the screen, of the cut out or perforated outlines. What was read was the shadow. It was the creation of the shadow through the light that, in a sort of skia-graphia, allowed a vision otherwise impossible, if it had remained “immediate”.
But we will follow the trail of these shadows in another passage. We will linger on an other meaning of the transparency, to which Kierkegaard’s text introduces us.
“If I look at a sheet of paper, to outward observation there may be nothing remarkable about it; it is only when I hold it up to the light of day and see through it that I discover the delicate inner picture which is as though too insubstantial to be seen immediately”20.
Kierkegaard’s whole metaphor is tied to the relationship between doubt and the reflective sorrow that does not let itself be represented because is turned inward – even as it is constantly becoming and in discord with itself. “Only a careful observer foresee its disappearance”; the reflective sorrow, that is, lets itself be perceived only in the moment and the movement of its passing away.
“Thus the fisherman sits and directs his attention unwaveringly on the float, yet the float does not interest him at all, only the movements down on the sea-bed. So the outer does indeed have significance for us, yet not as an expression of the inner but like a telegram telling of something hidden deep within. When you look long and attentively at a face, you sometimes discover that is as if there were another face within the one you see”21.
What the fisherman happens to discover here is more than a objective truth: it is
something truer than an immediate truth, the uncanny reflection of an image inside the observer himself. Similarly, what is revealed to the translator are the new forms of his own language.
Let us go back to the term skyggerids. To record, to trace with the shadow. The verb ridse means in English to scratch, which maintains all the valences of the Greek graphein. And the original concept of this verb was that of a common tool to various linguistic expressions: “During the so called Dark Ages, that is, broadly speaking, from the twelfth to the eight centuries before our era, Greece, which as you know has no knowledge of imagery in the proper sense of the term, nor does it use systems of figural representation. The same word, graphein, it should be noted, is used for writing, drawing, and painting”22.
To this citation I would like to add another one from Rudolf Pannowitz, in Benjamin’s essay: “… The basic error of the translator is that he preserves the state in which his own language happens to be instead of allowing his language to be powerfully affected by the foreign tongue. Particularly when translating from a language very remote from his own he must go back to the primal elements of language itself and penetrate to the point where work, image and tone converge”23.
If one gets near to this, in some way ‘primitive’, meaning of graphein, it is difficult not to think how the issue of translation from one written language to an other follows the same path of the translation between various forms of perception and acoustic, iconic, graphic experiences, all tied to the historical and biographical background of the translator. He must graft onto these the intrusive elements introduced to him, transforming them, and transforming with them his own language.
“To receive the alien, it means also to endure its intrusion. Very rarely it is admitted: the subject of the intruder is by itself an intrusion in our moral correction (and is also a remarkable example of the political correctness). And however it is indissociable from the truth of the alien”24. A work in which the truth of extraneity remains preserved can be only a mixing, since only there can a transformation take place that goes behind the simple testimony of diversity.
I offer the example of an ancient figure of mixing, the cento, that has often been considered a second rate artistic form. A cento was a text composed by putting together verses and phrases pertaining to other’s texts; extracted from their original body, those were denaturated in the same moment in which their were put to use.
The cento (from the Latin, cento-centonis, a patchwork garment) is a typical literary composition during periods of decay, historical moments in which there has been a breach in tradition, and when values before considered obvious have lost their meaning. It was frequent during the late Roman Empire, although there are known homeric or virgilian centos from the second century after Christ. But this technique also was used in the figurative art that today, as profanes, we would call ‘classic’, was used this technique. Constantine’s arch in Rome is a meaningful example of it. The entire monument is a recycling of architectonic elements (frames, capitals, columns), but also of reliefs and sculptures coming from older monuments. For scholars, it is today difficult to reconstruct, even if that would make sense, what is of Constantinian age and what is instead of the time of Adrian or Traian. In some bas-reliefs the heads of the emperors of the II century had been carved out and replaced with portraits of Constantine; whether this happened for ideological reasons or economical is not clear, but what is of interest here is the process of a displacement and shifting of an iconography that eventually changes its very meaning. The misunderstanding, intentional or not, therefore seems to be at the very heart of this procedure.
Misunderstanding seems to be unavoidable because of the method of constructing a work that is made out of fragments taken from preexisting works. The method is that of testing, perforating, withdrawing, juxtaposing. It expresses itself in its freedom towards its subject, independently from tradition and against tradition. It does not cover the original material with a veil of contemporaneity, as an aestheticizing procedure might do. The sampling, the piercing, the extraction of single elements – all these are a prelude to the creation of a new work. This can pass only through a change in the meaning of the previous one. It is an expression of violence; a violence of the extraction, a violence of the transplantation. Therefore, as in musical mixing, with the cento the quotation is at the same time a transformation of what is quoted.
The cento is and is not a translation at the same time. Or, if it is, it is only in its lack of respect for its subject, that it is also compassion for this same subject. In revealing the features of the subject, it disguises them; in reducing the statue to a trunk it develops the latent images of it; in laying one over the other the distinct forms, it reopens them to the reign of possibilities.

In conclusion: starting from a contradiction between mechanical memory and translatability, we have seen that it is possible to conceive translation as a transplant; we also have seen how transplanting is a method applicable not only to the musical practice of mixing but also to the artistic one of centonism. Furthermore, translation as transplant is a concept, and is the only one that allows us to face and experiment the irreducibility of linguistic and aesthetic differences. If transparency can be a translation’s attribute, it is because they both belong to the process of mediation and combination of alterities.

As an example, in music, of a translation/transplant/transparency see, in the Theory Department Web site (…), Philippe Poirier’s 5×78 Sample and Rodolphe Burger’s Monteverdi/Unlimited lament. Both were performed in the context of the show Leaving Pictures. Towards an art of history, Rome, March 1999.

2000

PS: this texts presents 24 footnotes. When I’ll find time, I will copy them from the original Word document.

Leaving Pictures (1999)

Leaving Pictures: Towards an Art of History

Far from the Pictures was the title of an album by Kat Onoma, a French band whose musical offerings range from  Monteverdi’s  madrigals to Kraftwerk’s radioactive litanies.  Of course, there the thing was music, sound;  and those sounds, and that music, had a certain sobriety.  Therefore, the invitation to distance oneself from the pictures appeared justified and not, as it might seem, contrived.  I repeat this invitation here.  Although in this text we will be concerned mostly with visual arts and visions, we will see how an invitation to go through and beyond and away from pictures is not unjustified. In a parody of the Platonic affirmation that we can conduct politics only by rejecting politics, let us say that we can – and must- work with images only by experiencing discouragement in the face of the image. Having taken over the weapons of representation, we will have to attack representation.
The relationship between art and history is at stake in the kind of work I am presenting here. It may be viewed from many different perspectives.  I will list here, very briefly, at least three ways in which an artist may look at history.
1.  As presence, persistence, and continuity of the past, at whose extreme end we find ourselves:  hence an art of quotation, of representation.
2.  As context, as a temporally defined ambience in which one lives and functions:  hence political, or at least engaged art.
3.  As recognized heritage, as an object of reflection and re-presentation:  hence an art of history.
All these ways are necessarily intertwined, but I would isolate the one which I find most interesting and fertile: the last, the one that appears as the current form of ‘history painting’, and that does more than the others to bring artistic practice closer to the role of interpreting the world, of ‘saying the unsaid.’
As a point of departure, this hermeneutic view of art of course has its own limits, which can be found in the very possibility of interpreting what is around and within us.  But if we call ourselves ‘artists,’ or if we have chosen art as a mode of living, it is because at the very outset we were confronted precisely with the question of meaning, and the only answer we could give was this:  neither to simply register, nor to simply express, but to transform what is given.  In other words, to go through and beyond interpretation and turn the work of art into a work of translation, a work of appropriation that, according to George Steiner, ‘transforms.’
A transformative practice of artistic work is at least interesting because it does not reduce the work to mere self-affirmation.  It gives form to the attempt — an attempt to which we are condemned by ethics — to reweave, re-stitch, and glue the pieces together without stopping, and without end, into weaves and patterns that are different from those that we involuntarily inherited and to which we bear witness.  And this without any pretense of being able to recreate something, but only with the pretense of saying what remains, which is to say, what is lost.
Such a work of appropriation and translation can, and even must, remain obscure and even unconscious in its development, since, in transcending the chosen object, a certain loss of memory on the part of whoever chose the object is necessary.

The kind of art that is interested in historical heritage is not necessarily an art of memory, much less political art.  If it possesses the quality of art, then it is political.  How easy it is to conceal aesthetic insufficiency behind an appeal to memory as a positive value in itself (or at least as a consolation), behind the appeal to principles and good intentions!  But the issue remains – and it is a decisive one – of the quality of artistic work, which alone justifies the renewal and transformation of images-history, and returns the artist to the condition of a creator.  Otherwise, kitsch — which does not transform but merely displaces — is around the corner.
If it is art, then it is not historiography.  Art is not there to say, ‘Look, I’ll tell you how things went.’  It is not even there to say, ‘they could have gone differently,’ or to offer lessons on how they could have gone.  Fortunately, today even historians think in different terms.  Would art’s role then be that of transmitting a truth more truthful than the one that other disciplines might claim to have?  It is not even this.  But, perhaps, an art of history might be more able than others to say the possible, and this because of its ‘parasitical’ nature, which we will try to elucidate in this slender volume.
An art of history is indeed parasitic, as it depends directly on its documents.  A historical source is generally viewed in two ways: either as a mere and truthful testimony, or as a ‘suggestive,’ ‘evocative’ text.  The attempt here is to find a different way of treating it, one that would put the emphasis on its possible transformation.  This transformation can only take place by a process which is at the same time interpretative and metamorphic.
Let history then be subjected to art, as long as the respective boundaries are traced;  and it is with this in view that our discourse revolves around the role of the document.  The waste, the remains, the findings, on one side;  attention, choice, and metamorphosis, on the other.
The question of inclusion and exclusion, the question of choice, is primary when it concerns-as it does here – the reworking of a given material. In fact, we return to the first question of this collection: what is it that comes to be designated as a document, why is it chosen and through what processes does it become the material of a possible work ? In the choice, in the reworking, there is evidently the reduction of what is possible into a design formed by all of the conditions of a given subjectivity and a given historical moment. However, in some cases, the choice and reworking range through the field of infinite possibilities.
And, in fact, we are not looking for an improbable re-construction of history;  rather, we are attempting a multiform re-exposition.  History is neither progressive nor circular.  It is eternally fragmented and interrupted, resumed and distorted like a record on the mixing console of an improvising disc-jockey. Rather than something that develops or that returns, we are faced with a jumble of ruins out of which we have to extract the pieces of new assemblages, of new, polymorphous Frankensteins of art and history.

1999

Abstracts of Anamnesis (1995)

Et tout ce qui tremble
et tout ce qui s’agite
aux confins de l’image.
Jean-Luc Nancy

There are memories. There are images and signs. There are works. These could be the last sentences of a talk. They could also be the only ones.
In the following I will briefly sail between two or three couples of Scylla and Charybdis that could take the name of painting and history, or image and memory, or body and sign.
First if all, let me affirm that without any doubts, as a painter, a European painter living in the twentieth-century I am a Greek. I am Greek, Latin, and also German. This is the problem: the legacy the images, the transmission.

1.

We cannot think without images”, says Aristotle in his text On Memory and Recollection, and again: ‘memory, even the memory of concepts, cannot exist apart from imagery.”
Memory for the past, he suggests, perception for the present, hope for the future. We will say that none of the first terms of these pairs of words is independent from the other. They are, in their inadequateness, almost interchangeable. Or; at least, they live together; as in Augustine’s “I want to sing a song that I know already.” The object of memory is the absent one, is what no longer shares space with us, and is what is just an image. Memory is indeed the slave of the image; recollection, on the contrary, is precisely the activity of going behind images, of eliminating our dependence on them. Anamnesis, coming after and behind Mneme, sets together; in new orders, within “a sort of syllogistic process”, parts of the material that the latter is merely doomed to preserve. There is, indeed, the requirement of preserving and filing, and the imperative of attacking and questioning the inherited images. To accept the legacy and to let it fade away, leaving us scattered pieces of knowledge and consciousness.
It is clear, then, that for the advent of Anamnesis, a certain gap in time, a certain caesura or even obscurity is required: remembrance cannot happen without oblivion, and even without some unfaithfulness to one’s own past; and there is neither openness nor hope without betrayal. Even betrayal of the most beloved one, the absent one, the mere image.

2.

Behind the picture, there is an absent body; behind the vision, there is the indistinguishable.
In an article published in 1932 in the French Révue de philologie (“Le sens du mot KOLOSSOS et les noms grecs de la statue”), Emile Benveniste quotes a text from the sacred laws of Cyrene: ‘A suppliant stranger. If he has been sent into a home, if the master of the home knows who has sent him, he will at first call the sender, by name, for three days. But if this one is dead in the region or has perished elsewhere… he will make two kolossoi, one male, the other female, of wood or of earth, and he will offer to them, in his home, a part of everything. The rite being accomplished, he will bring the kolossoi (the statues) and the offerings into a wild forest, to fix them there.”
Here then: there is an absent one; the “suppliant stranger” is the one who creates a relation between this absent one and the receiver. The absent one is either evoked by his name, if this name is known, or if it is unknown, the statue will take the place of the name, of what calls: what gives him his existence.
The kolossos is a double; it takes the place and continues the existence of the one who has disappeared. It literally re-presents, presents again, the absent one, either dead or distant.
Benveniste eventually suggests a near eastern etymology for his word that associates it with an “erected object”, a “standing image”. It is this thing, then, the statue or the stele, that is meant to establish a relation between this world and the beyond, between a self and the otherness. This thing-double is called photography.
Thirty years after Benveniste, Jean-Pierre Vernant struggles again with this word:
in “The Representation of the Invisible and the Psychological Category of the Double: The Colossos” (in Myth and Thought Among the Greeks, London 1983) he points out how “the Greeks gave a visible form to certain powers of the beyond belonging to the sphere of the invisible.”
Either buried in an empty tomb, at a place of an absent corpse, or stuck into the ground in some desert spot, the kolossos was not meant to be an image (in the sense of “reproduction”): “What is embodied in permanent form in stone is not the image of the dead man but his life in the beyond, the life that is opposed to that of living men as the world of night is opposed to the world of light.”
Let’s roughly say: the camera obscura is our metaphorical tomb: the photograph will survive us, as the gravestones or the steles survive the bodies they recall.
Photographs, then, are more than pictures: as doubles, they re-present. They present, again and again. They present us to others, others present them to us, and they are the other’s presents. More than images, they are calls. They recall, as Anamnesis does.

3.

Roughly stated, the most evident analogy between photography and memory is the fact that both of them are originally mere reproduction machines; both of them are “receptive surfaces”, where some kinds of excitations remain, “for an unlimited time”, impressed, like a stick does on a wax tablet, for instance, or on a sheet of malleable lead, as in the tabulae defixionum (the lead rolls, etched with magic words and then transfixed with bronze nails, before being thrown in the tombs, that were used in ancient Greece and Rome to cast spells against one’s enemies or rivals).
We have to linger for a moment on this notion of written images, in this strait between grammata and phantasia. In another essay, “From the “presentification” of the invisible to the imitation of appearance” (Paris, 1985; English translation in Mortals and Immortals, Princeton, 1991), Vernant returns to the themes of the text I cited above. In particular, he stresses how “during the so-called Dark Ages, that is, broadly speaking, from the twelfth to the eighth centuries before our era, Greece, which as you know has no knowledge of writing, also has no knowledge of imagery in the proper sense of the term, nor does it use systems of figural representation. The same word, graphein, it should be noted, is used for writing, drawing and painting.”
Only later, and under the influence of the Eastern civilization, the Greeks will start both to organize the anthropomorphic canons of plastic art, and to fix the written records of history and thought.
But, for now, let’s cast a relation between this primitive sense of the word graphein – one that welcomes and comprehends “writing, drawing and painting” – and the gestures of a hand that traces signs, indicating the living together of different means of expression.
We know well how reproduced images and written words belong to irreducibly distinct system of language, and can never be read together – they can only be juxtaposed or superimposed. There will always be, between them, a lapse, a providential and fertile one, both in space or in time.
What is interesting is to respect this distance, without looking forward to fusional relations, to literal images or imagistic letters. I would like to imagine this lapse as a sort of petit mal, what the dictionaries define as “a brief blackout of consciousness without tonic or clonic movements”; this means, let’s say, a caesura. One could imagine a sort of piercing of visible space by the needles of time and language (this would be the contrary of what the photograph does to history, that is, piercing, fragmenting time with space).
But we can establish bridges, relations. We can exploit repetition itself (repetition that, as Aristotle says, “generates a nature”).
I will just take what I need from a text, in order to offer a sort of model of work: in this early treatise on aphasia (1891), Freud points out a few relations between words and things; it is, once again, a story of reproduction. “We learn to spell”, he says, “by linking the visual images of the letters with new sound-images, which, for their part, must remind us of verbal sounds which we already know. We at once ‘repeat’ the sound-image that denotes the letter,” etcetera, etcetera.

4.

Our vision of History, if not its very nature, has changed. The writing of History has, consequently, and in a parallel way, also changed. The grammata is now no more than a fraction of the photogrammata. “History”, it has been said (E.Cadava, “Words of Light: Theses on the Photography of History”, diacritics, fall-winter 1992), “happens with photography.” And the photograph, more than the trace of history is, to this day, a sort of double (psyche?) of history itself. Then, if I can stretch forward my previous metaphor; the absent one represented by the kolossos is nothing but “our” History.
What we hang on the walls, then, and exhibit, is nothing but hung and exhibited history. It is possible to hang history on walls, because it is no longer “ours”, it is no longer, I quite Jean-Luc Nancy, “the general program of a certain Humanity, a Subject, a Progress” (‘Our History,” diacritics, fall 1990). We all know this too well for me to linger on this issue. But what remains is a sort of heritage with no senders, or anonymous ones, a sort of “suppliant stranger” who knocks insistently and noisily at our door. What remains is a mass of noisy material, a saturated, excessive and obsessive memory. And, I quote G. Vattimo (“L’impossible oubli”, in Usages de l’oubli, Colloque de Royaumont, Paris 1988), we cannot deny that “this condition characterized by an excess of history, by the difficulty, even the impossibility, of forgetfulness, has become, in a very large sense, also ours.”
In this regard, every art that is meant to represent only itself, or even only itself within some tradition, is an expression of kitsch.
In fact, every self-recognized or self-affirming form of art, every form of art that -forgets for a moment the uncanny character of our present, is an art of forgetting, is the offspring of Amnesia. There is, I believe, even for those who work with, through and behind the picture, an “anamnestic and anesthetic responsibility”, which is neither the flat exaltation of memory, nor the pathos surrounding historical horror.
This responsibility begins in the saturation of the image, in the contaminated field where the distinction between apology and denegation, commemoration and refusal is unclear and undetermined.
What remains to be done is to collect and recollect the blurred noises around us, the sounds of what has disappeared, and to represent them. What remains is to collect the floating fragments of this history, to dig bones, documents, and to signal, to transmit them. What remains is the possibility of a gesture: to hand, to hold out, in the scattered testimony to which we are doomed, some vestigia, some expressions of a multiple Anamnesis.

New York 1995

Telegrams (1993)

On Painting as Translation

The stories that I am going to lay out are not meant to constitute a whole picture or organic tableau. On the contrary, my stories will be disjointed ; they will be examples, sometimes oblique examples, of a discourse on the way in which certain literary texts can exercise their influence on a person’s attempts to practice, or practice in, the visual arts. These stories, I present them to you as splinters of experience and as fragments of a reflection that has marked the work that I will show you after my short talk. I hope that the processing of images that you will see will be like the thread sewing together the scattered moments of this experience.

I will discuss four topics :

1. Stendhal’s Pictograms
2. Artaud’s Cryptograms
3. Bataille´s Photograms
4. Benjamin’s Topograms

Stendhal’s pictograms

I want to say words about Henri Beyle, who used the name Stendhal, or Henry Brulard, and about the circumstances that led him to write the story of his life.
In the morning of October 16, 1832, Henri Beyle (who was, then, French Consul in the coastal town of Civitavecchia in the Papal States) found himself in Rome on the Janiculum Hill in front of the church San Pietro in Montorio. Instead of putting my words in his mouth, I will quote the very first lines of his book, the Life of Henry Brulard.

I was standing this morning, October sixteenth, eighteen thirty-two, by San Pietro in  Montorio, on the Janiculum Hill in Rome, in magnificent sunshine. A few small clouds, borne on a barely perceptible sirocco wind, were floating above Monte Albano, a delicious warmth filled the air and I was happy to be alive.

All of Rome, both ancient and modern, unfolds under Stendhal’s eyes from this location, the square before the church, which forms a terrace overlooking the city, which is a place unique in the world, where Raphael’s Transfiguration had been the object of admiration during two and a half centuries, or two hundred and fifty years.

Ah! (Stendhal writes) in three months I shall be fifty; can that really be so ! Seventeen eighty-three (1783), ninety-three (’93), eighteen hundred and three (1803) — I’m reckoning on my fingers – and eighteen thirty-three (1833) make fifty. Is it really possible ? Fifty !

This unexpected discovery did not vex me ; He says I had been thinking about Hannibal and the Romans.

In Stendhal’s reconstruction in words, there is a double layering or stratification of reflection and memory. Under his eyes lies Rome: like an open archaeological excavation site, it exhibits history’s layers one on top of the other, from antiquity until now, when Stendhal beholds it. These are the first layers or strata; the second set of strata or layers consists of the movement of time coming toward him, all of time leading up to this October 16, 1832. Stendhal notices that Raphael’s painting have hung there for two hundred and fifty years, that is to say five times fifty; he remarks: “and I am fifty years old !”.
“I shall soon be fifty, it’s high time I got to know myself. I should really find it very hard to say what I have been and what I am”.

The project he undertakes is devoted to establishing a line of continuity. A continuity of self-knowledge, but also a continuity in relation to a future reader, the intelligent interlocutor Stendhal lacks in his present.

You can see a straight line in the time scheme (from Hannibal and the Romans all the way to the future reader), but this line breaks at some point. This point is a moment when the pleasure of anamnesis, the pleasure of bringing in and bringing up the past, is the strongest, and this is when an exclusive and strong connection is made between the act of remembering and the actual past. This is a point in time when something unusual happens.

In a text, such as the one from which I have been risking, that is remarkable already because there is such a short distance between itself and its object, it seems as if even this small gap automatically created by the writing gesture has become unbearable, insufferable. There thus comes a moment when one must look for, and find, a better way to immerse oneself in the past, or literally to bring the past toward oneself. This is a need, and it requires another means, different from the alphabetic one, of making inscriptions. We are going to see exactly how Stendhal is moving to a different graphic medium.

He recalls his ancient loves and feels an urge to trace on a dusty trail the names or initials of the women he loved. He takes a walk on a solitary trail overlooking Lake Albano, he stops and, with his walking stick, writes those initials on the ground, in the dust, “as did Zadig,” he notes. Later he tackles the Life of Henry Brulard again.
(Here I should at least allude to the layering of the various names, and how in Stendhal there is no identity or identification without this disguise of names or pseudonyms.)

As he resumes writing Henry Brulard, he thinks again about the women he has loved and he thinks about himself in the act of writing their names in the dusty trail. And now, suddenly, he switches media: he interrupts the written manuscript with a sketch. The sketch of himself, on the trail by Lake Albano, in the act of tracing women’s names on the dusty ground.

From that moment on, and each time something particular in his work of rememoration triggers an emotion (it could also be an intense pleasure, naturally), he replaces the description in words with one in images. In this way now, his manuscript is interrupted on almost every page, is stuffed with sketches, maps, figures with legends, or abbreviations that lead to notes of explanation.

I can summarise where the drawing fits in, in the book, by saying that the drawings complete or replace the writing in words with another writing that one can perceive as more precise, more immediate and truer, perhaps more efficient when it comes to reconstituting or resurrecting the past, to reducing the distance from himself.

I can’t help but wonder what method or means Stendhal would have chosen if, instead of writing his life just a few years before the official invention of photography, he had found himself delving in his past and beholding Rome at the same time, at a moment when cameras were available. In any case he probably would have turned into a passionate amateur photographer, given his obsession with precise recalling. (He said: “I cannot render facts in their reality; I can only give their shadows”). It occurs to him that memory deals with fragments; he says: “Next to the brightest faces, I find missing parts in my memory, like a fresco from which large sections have dropped away.”

Whatever the case may be, I am confident that Stendhal would have still done his sketches and drawings, what we can call his pictograms, which come to his emotional rescue.

Artaud’s cryptograms

Let us step back a little bit and suppose that instead of using a language that describes things while keeping at a safe and steady distance from those things, one handled words that resemble the objects in question or the circumstances they aim to express; that we had a “resembling” language that was disjointed, that precede syntax; that the words pronounced did barely more than dress things up, the written words remaining barely shaped and still isolated from one another. Such a language that does not distance itself from things, which is a language of the guts, both a particular and a universal language, was the one employed by Antonin Artaud.

For years I have had an idea of the consumption, the internal consummation  of language by the unearthing of all manner of torpid and filthy necessity. And, in nineteen thirty-four, I wrote a whole book with this intention, in a language which was not French but which everyone in the world could read, no matter what their nationality. (From Artaud’s Letter to Henri Parisot).

Among many other texts, I should refer to Artaud’s text on Van Gogh, and to its organic, volcanic, intolerably passionate language, to its untiring and breathless rhythm.

Antonin Artaud wrote this text on Van Gogh in 1947, after he saw a large Van Gogh exhibition in Paris. His title is Van Gogh, The Man Suicided by Society. Here, as in Stendhal, there is a remarkable passage, a sort of jump both in the emotions and in the language, a jump resulting from the identifying character of these writings. In Artaud’s text, the reader passes several times and quite suddenly from a regular sentence to a sort of encoded sound or cryptogram.

It is literally true that I saw the face of Van Gogh, red with blood in the explosion of his landscapes, coming toward me
Kohan
taver
tensur
purtan
in a conflagration
in a bombardment
in an explosion

These expressions really have no meaning; they simply evoke something that comes from elsewhere and an ancient time, something from time immemorial. Here the reader finds him -or herself- grappling with questions surrounding the origin of language or rather, to be more precise, with the tension towards an origin.

Empedocles, in one of his fragments, places man’s birth in a sort of generalised disjointed state :

On it (the earth), many heads sprung up without necks and arms wandered bare and bereft of shoulders. Eyes wandered up and down in want of foreheads. (Fragment 57)

Solitary limbs wandered seeking for union. (Fragment 58)

These are, then, organs that are lost, gone astray, trying to unite with a body or to find a body that would link them in one way or another. This actually foreshadows Georges Bataille and his “disorder of the human body, work of a violent disagreement of its organs” (“Le gros orteil,” in Documents 1929).

Often artists feel that their paintings are like bodies with which they need to wrestle, in face-to-face confrontations, and there is no telling who will win the fight. Let us try to imagine such a fight against such a body as Empedocles describes it, a body that is not a body, a body, dislocated, exploded, an organic entity yet disorganised and incoherent.

Shambling creatures with countless hands. (Fragments 60)

Clearly there can be no face-to-face encounter or fight with such an entity, nonetheless it is
necessary and cannot be avoided. Let us consider the artist and the painting as body and soul, as Aristotle depicts them in his text on Etruscan torture. Cicero reports that Aristotle stated that man’s condition is as follow:

We live through tortures like the ones suffered by those who, in an earlier time, were killed in a very refined manner by Etruscan pirates who captured them: the live bodies of prisoners were tied very precisely to the bodies of dead ones in such a way that the front part of each living one was fit to the front of a dead one. That is how these living ones were linked to the dead ones as our souls are tightly linked to our bodies.

I imagine that one of these inseparable parts is the shadow. The shadow could be the memory; indeed, memory holds us tightly, it keeps us from becoming severed from ourselves ; it ties us to our own history in a loyal, sometimes too loyal, relationship to our identity: “he who cannot forget will achieve nothing”, said Kierkegaard.

Georges Bataille’s photograms

If we speak of bodies and signs, we speak of anatomy, we speak of the body opening to allow the retrieval of signs. These signs can speak of themselves or they can speak of the body that contains them, but above all these can, for the anatomist, speak of other bodies. Therefore such signs will make it possible to open up to the experience of other bodies and other things.

I have mentioned body organs, torture, severed limbs, and cut-up tongues. This brings to mind the most intense photographic picture, next to which any other photographic image becomes an act of torture because of its kinship with this particular image. I am speaking of the Chinese torture image, that appears in Bataille’s book The Tears of Eros (1961).

“Since 1925”, Bataille says, “I have owned one of these pictures. It was given to me by Doctor Borel, one of the first French psychoanalysts. This photograph had a decisive role in my life. I have never stopped being obsessed by this image of pain, at once ecstatic and intolerable”.

Bataille in fact presents four images in a row. A fifth one exists, which is the last one and the most terrifying ; Bataille did not include it in his book. These images were readily available and could be bought as stereograms, with the brand name Veroscope. The word “veroscope” points to the trustworthiness of the three-dimensional, stereoscopic images in their capacity to restore the presence of the thing.

It is well known that Bataille is interested in the ravished and ecstatic expression of the young Chinese man who is being tortured. Bataille says also, however, that the young man’s expression could be caused by a large dose of opium given to this patient who is being subjected to a live anatomical dissection.

The point here is that Bataille is interpreting physiognomy instead of taking the photo as the simple capture of a moment of affective violence.

I will come back to the question of physiognomy in a moment. For now, I want to discuss the parallel I make between the anatomy of language and the language of the body. Let me tell a bit more on what I am calling “somatograms”.

The gesture that consists in copying, in transcribing, in reproducing is most closely related to the work of interpreting or translating of which it constitutes the sine qua non.

The technical reproduction of the inside of the human body is, of course, known as radiography or X-ray photography (not to mention more recent imaging and scanning techniques). X-ray imaging makes use of the principles of photography (by making an image on a chemically treated plate) and the principles of radioactivity (by penetrating the resistance, that is to say the unity of bodies, with rays).

Therefore radiography is a photocopy of what is hidden ; it is a “radiocopy”.

The spectral image we see offers alternate patterns of shade and light. This image possesses the characteristics of a double and a negative; it constitutes a kind of representation of the aura (I will speak imminently of the “aura” in Walter Benjamin’s writing), or, if you prefer, this image is a soul-guard of the body, or a bodyguard of the soul.

I just want to quote briefly a well-known text, which is very evocative in this context. Is Kafka’s comment on photography, in which he seems to oppose interior vision and bird’s-eye vision:

Photography concentrates one’s eye on the superficial. For that reason it obscures the hidden life which glimmers through the outlines of things like a play of light and shade. One can’t catch that even with the sharpest lens. One has to grope for it by feeling… This automatic camera doesn’t multiply men’s eyes but only gives a fantastically simplified fly’s-eye view.

Walter Benjamin’s topograms

In speaking of reproduction, I want to push further the metaphoric relation between written text and bodily texture. This leads me to Walter Benjamin, the famous German critic and philosopher.

In his books, he comes back several times to questions having to do with copying, transcribing texts manually. There is one such passage, for example, in which he tells of having to stay in school and copy texts as punishment (in Berliner Kindheit, written toward the end of the Thirties; the passage is entitled Strafe des Nachsitzens). Elsewhere he compares the reader’s activity with that of a scribe or transcriber: the former is like a passenger in an aeroplane who would decipher a landscape that he sees as a whole, in its entirety, but without seeing the ups and the downs, the roughness, the unevenness, while the latter would be like the driver of an automobile, well aware of the roughness of the terrain, who would travel through the same landscape.

In these images given by Benjamin, there is a sort of truth of contact, of slowness, whether the transcribing is done voluntarily or not. Can there be any greater fidelity to the text than to walk and proceed through it step by step by transcribing it letter by letter?

(Remember now Stendhal’s fidelity or loyalty to his memory, his ancient loves, his names and the names of his women, and think of the mapping out, the  topograms resulting from this; think of the topographical image of written reproduction found in Benjamin; think also of the structure of Benjamin’s work, Einbahnstrasse (One-way Street), of 1928).

To reproduce is to repeat. Photography, like memory, reproduces, reproduces itself, and repeats itself. The illusion that one relives something comes with repetition. One is fooled by a reality of which there is a photographic double.

There is a text on photography by Georges Bataille. It was published in the journal Documents in 1929 and it was called Figure humaine, “The Human Figure”. As he comments one of the most banal pictures that exists, that is to say a group photograph taken at a wedding somewhere in France in 1905, Bataille attacks the paltry and misleading nature of photographic portraits in general.

Photography is too easy, he implies.

Now, unlike in other places and times, and because of photography, we have stopped being haunted by spectres or ghosts who, having “the miserable aspect of half-decomposed bodies,” might be feared as man-eaters. Photography proposes us, instead, a laughable ersatz of our spectres.

Photography covers and dresses wounds, it mitigates, it takes the edge off things, it consoles, it claims to preserve. It is guilty since it furnishes us with a small and misleading part of reality. Photography feeds the illusion that we  are in touch with what has been, while masking the actual truth of what has preceded us, namely the dissolution and disappearance of things, and cancelling instants themselves by its own instantaneous action, cancels our right to the instant to the unknown.

Bataille’s critique of photography is close to Kafka’s; photography does not leave us in peace with our own spectres.

I quote Bataille again:“The very fact that one is haunted by such benign apparitions gives fear and anger a pathetic or laughable value”.

It is the pretension to truth-telling itself that Bataille is aiming at here.
Bataille attacks photography’s pretence to reach the truth. The human figure reproduced by photographic means claims to reconstitute a human nature.
To such a pretence, Bataille opposes, I quote, “a presence as irreducible as that of the ego.”

I want to simplify things a little here and say that we are dealing here with a criminality of photography, which consists in endangering the individual; it is, though, a crime of lèse-individualité.

Bataille is not far from the views that stretch from Baudelaire to Valéry and others, and which underscore essentially the documentary role of this means of technical reproduction, photography, in opposition to the subjective freedom on which rests the work of art. Bataille sees photography as participating fully in the movement that began in the early years of the nineteenth century, the movement that strove to recover (and recognise?) the human figure by any means.

Photography is the expression of an “intellectual voracity,” which goes from Lavater’s work in physiognomy (in the second half of the eighteenth century) to Gall’s phrenology, Broca’s craniology, and Lombroso’s criminal anthropology, followed by Charcot’s photographic iconography, as well as Bertillon’s metric anthropology, all the way (perhaps a little arbitrarily) to a number of scientific publications, such as (I translate the French titles):
Nineteen Visible Physical Defects to Recognise a Jew, published in Paris in 1903, and How to Recognise and Explain a Jew : With Ten Plates, Followed by a Moral Portrait of Jews, Paris, 1940.

Only one thing links the names and texts I just listed: it is an obsession to recognise and identify. Even the language used legally to describe such identifications and classifications exhibits the optimistic and procedural character of this obsession; it is always something that has to do with a process, with a trial, in a sense, a procedure, in which you can read an inexorable movement to pin the other down.

Instead of that, I think it is preferable to subscribe to the notion that knowledge of the other, becoming acquainted with the other (instead of recognition, which brings everything back to pre-existing schemes) occurs in an almost static way, beyond all expectation.

The Work of Art in the Age of its Mechanical Reproduction, published by Benjamin in 1936, is too well known for me to dwell on it here. I will limit myself to one aspect I am particularly interested in today and which I referred to earlier, the discussion of aura.

With mechanical or technical reproduction of images, you lose what is authentic, you lose the connection to a particular time and place. The photographed or filmed object is abstracted from tradition, it moves closer to the viewer, and by doing so it loses it sacred character and its aura. “We define the aura as the unique phenomenon of distance, however close it may be…Whether we are talking of works of art or natural objects”. Photography removes from objects their cult value or cultural function. But, Benjamin adds,

…cult value does not give way without resistance. It retires into an ultimate entrenchment: the human countenance. It is no accident that the portrait was the focal point of early photography. The cult of remembrance of loved ones, absent or dead, offers a last refuge for the cult value of the picture. For the last time, the aura emanates from the early photographs in the fleeting expression of a human face. This is what constitutes their melancholy, incomparable beauty.

If I follow him, I see that photography stands out in a special way. While separating the object from its cult value, photography also furnishes a cult object, which is the human figure. It gives us visual traces and signs, optical hooks, so to speak, which allow our “cult of remembrance of loved ones, absent or dead”, to expand. (I don’t subscribe here to the Benjamin’s distinction between “early” and “modern” photographic images. I guess that it depends on his need of being faithful to his idea of the aura as “glance of the obsolete”).

However, this cult is embedded in the very notion of resemblance and proximity to the object that has moved away from us. Aura, then, is what is absent from the image but what inhabits the space between us and the reproduction, and therefore aura is what allows the relation and not what keeps the object unique and distant from us. So, the photography can be holder of an hidden content. We are able to catch “also, through the reproduction, what is unique” (A short History of photography, 1931).

Following Bataille, photography’s crime is the visibility itself, is verisimilitude, resemblance, excessive closeness, contamination by kinship; all these things dictate the banality of photography’s evil, its monstrosity (“monstrosity without madness”).

For Benjamin, the aura is lost and found again in the fleeting expression of a human face; it is found in the instant of taking the picture, in a moment of social identification given by this image, and in which the light arrests the time.

It is easy to see, then, that a similar photographic document can be monstrous for one person and “incomparably” beautiful for another. The former rejects it in the name of the “irreducible ego”, and the latter admires it because of the short-circuit in distance and kinship, in loss and identification. He doesn’t ask it to be “true”.

Benjamin says that these images are beautiful because they are melancholic. Beauty here is a matter of emotion. this emotion has to do with mourning. In the age of photography, mourning and the cult of the dead have replaced the cult of gods. Bataille rejects the cult of the dead and he rejects any pious image that pretends to represent the dead. There isn’t any sacredness in the technical image.

In the name of the identification with the past, the distant past in some other place, Benjamin finds an aura in photographic reproduction. To copy, to transcribe, to translate, to adhere to a distant object, to tradition, those are his joys. To draw, to map out the places, to trace in the dusty ground the names of old loves, rewrite the story of one’s childhood, retrieve past times, also.

I see the snapshot, in this context, as the point in the telegraphic communication; it is necessary to the comprehension of the text, which is a line in time. For Bataille, the flash cannot be followed by any trace; it is just an instant. No past, no future. Just acceptance.

Fall 1993

From Translation to Imitation (1990)

1.Transfers
In 1835, at the age of fifty-two, the French consul in Civitavecchia decided to devote himself to the written reconstruction of his life, in order to fight, in his own words, the idleness and the boredom which overwhelmed him and to “allow myself the pleasure of looking back for a while.” This work of excavation into memory – so accurate that the three thick volumes Stendhal was able to fill barely cover the first seventeen years of his life – he obviously enjoyed very much, as any reader will acknowledge when he discovers the scribbles and scrawls which from the very first pages interrupt the narration, crammed into the manuscript as Stendhal cheerfully revisits the places and landscapes of his childhood.

The work was never finished, but its author meant it to be published. We don’t know whether the sketches would have been kept in the final text. Such a publication would not have been unprecedented, for there was a model, which Stendhal knew well and loved: Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, published seventy-five years earlier. As we know, Shandy’s fictitious autobiography digs so deep into the past that we never get to witness the hero’s birth. Symbols, sketches, graphic schemes are interspersed in the written narration, bearing witness to Sterne’s audacious inventiveness, which led him to allow the intrusion of improper codes into the text, and their integration therein.

These two books could be seen as a challenge, from a painter’s point of view: how should one use the “anamnestic” procedures introduced by Stendhal and Sterne, while inverting the terms – i. e., allowing the incursion of writing into the pictorial mean (the visual presentation) so as to distort it? Thus defined, this challenge appears to be a problem of translation, if by translation one is to understand the rejection of any specialized or specialists’ approach.

Contaminating forms, setting oneself as a translator (the translator being by definition the person who moves through or “goes between”, without crossing the border which leads to originality), means to adopt the attitude of an amateur. One the one hand, this implies an opposition, a resistance not only against the supremacy of technique and mere ability, but also against a certain levelling of the individual which any specialization involves. On the other hand, this “amateurness” means that one may choose, along with the lightness, the continuous possibility of choice that such an attitude allows. Besides, one must consider the following conclusive consideration: there is little left to say, today, in art, and even if one could go on speaking forever and endlessly representing oneself, one wouldn’t have, as Fitzgerald says, more than one or two original ideas to express, a couple of personal obsessions. There is therefore no need to pile up talk on talk, show on show. But rather to give time to expectation – to load expectation, with experience and the awareness of experience – to be able to translate them, if it so happens, into a work.

One must add, however, that such an “amateur” practise entails a risk of its own – not the kind of risk to be confronted in a totalising, promethean commitment, but the one which arises in void and expectation. Emptiness, delaying do not necessarily imply concentration or contemplation. They might be embodied, rather, in a kind of distracted attention, in a looking or staring askance.

Neither intention nor its fulfilment (the execution) is interesting. What’s interesting is the surprise. It is not the artist who surprises the work but quite the contrary: the work surprises and changes the artist, taking him in his moments of negligence, from his blind side; arriving, when it does, as a gift.
Looking askance, speaking askance. Not naming, not taking possession; calling the thing and leaving it to itself.

(I must confess, here between two chapters, a simulation: namely, that one never saw a painting of this century; that one stands with virgin eyes before books, and that, therefore, translation is a one-way process, going from the writers so to say to the paintings).

2. Aurora
The pictures must be silent. But all silences are not equal. The difficulty is to find a right quality, a good tone of silence. The tone of silence is important: it is the restitution of possibility.
The deeper silence is not that of void but of fullness; it is not to be found in absence but in presence. The past contains the deepest silence.
How to sink into time within a painting: through movement, which connects space and time: looking for movement, which is the only thing that is worth seeking. The difficulty is to find it with colours, which are the amateur’s medium in painting. Green and red for instance, that uneasily fit together: the slowness of a green and the speed of a red.
One will have to trust forgetfulness. The picture will be the sea of forgetfulness, from whose depth the “anamnestic” fragments will resurface. As the artist, the amateur, is a translator, or a grinder, or a still and a retort, or a crucible, the fragments will come back floating in an arbitrary way, at random. One can only hope that some “iron hand of necessity shakes the begging bowl of chance” (Deleuze).
The artist would be a nomad, gleaning here and there, confident that he is the tool of something. An assembler, but incomplete, for he works in silence and silence, as we are in a world of human beings, far from presenting itself, presents the unsaid. Omission is therefore unavoidable, and frustration. Certainly happiness is not that of forgetfulness but that of being able of remembering it all, of possessing, therefore, at least one’s own memories, even though memories seldom tell: “we do need you.”
One is always drawn towards some origin, in this backward walk, perhaps towards the time when “on the earth numerous grew the heads without neck, and on their own wandered the arms deprived of shoulders, and the eyes roamed just as they were, which no forehead adorned” (Hempedocles).
Among the rights that our artist claims is the right to force into coexistence the surviving remains and leftovers of different semantic fields or time periods. As if he were a poor man he takes interest in the details and the refuse of social exchange.

3.Walls
I want to point out a path between the sea of forgetfulness and the wall of historical time. More than the scene of memory, we said, or the dawn of the big bang, what is of interest is something that turns around the origin, from some place that is not prehistory anymore nor yet history or bureaucracy. It would be a break at some undefined point of circular time, on the circle of time. It is taken for granted that the time of the artist is anti-modern. It is taken for granted that the artist mixes past and future; he is the one who acts under this crest: Strach and touha, fear and desire-nostalgia.
Fear, i. e. the feeling that dominates the most decisive and risky moments in operating and in staying, those moments when, out of distraction and carelessness, the clear presence takes shape, and during which a suspension of being opens the way that leads to conscience and commotion.
Desire-nostalgia, the aching tension towards something that is no more or not yet, that is, in several languages, expressed by the same word, like touha in Czech; one is drawn towards to the past with the same word with which one strains towards the future. Anything does, except the present. After all, any true and irremediable feeling of something originates in its loss. And also, perhaps, in its not being yet, when its whole treasure consists in a mere image: to give birth, to change continents, thus accomplishing a gesture no different from the one “that keeps tempting us: to bring some animal home, dog, cat, bird, turtle or hamster, under the attraction of a deep impulse, and immediately distracted from it ” (Ramondino).

4. Bodies
The walls are to be incised, the bodies too.
With pictures one fights bodily, hand-to-hand, one gives and receives painful hits. As Nietzsche says, almost anybody can bear pain, for there is little choice; arduous is to find the strength to inflict pain. But it is a matter of restitution, because we write or paint in order to pay our own due; and as the artists are revengeful, theirs are poisoned reimbursements. They bite the work with poisoned teeth.
There is no body without soul, it can’t be helped. The soul is the sign, probably, and what at the same time carries the weight. The body is the body and in the sign it disintegrates. This is made apparent in the Etruscan torture described by Aristotle (as quoted by Cicero): “We suffer a torture similar to that of those people who, in other times, when they fell into the hands of the Etruscan pirates, were put to death with refined cruelty: each live body was bound with painstaking precision to a corpse, in such a way that every anterior part of the live body was adjusted to its dead counterpart. As those living victims were tied to corpses, so our souls are tightly tied together with our bodies.”

5.Figures
Little remains to be said but the supremacy of language. Signs and figures are its calls, its witnesses. They are not to be distinguished from the picture: they sink into it. To paint would just be to make up into pages.
But such writing, that of a picture – itself loaded with figures either afloat on the sea of forgetfulness or carved on the walls of its maze – should imitate that of an orchestra. An orchestra, however, that wouldn’t express anything harmonic, or if so, only at random; not going beyond the “misleadingly banal, often troubling” moment, “that precedes the concert, during which it tunes up, that is, assembles itself” (Burger).
The figures are witnesses, not symbols; they are like natural elements, sticks or stones, almost -but not yet – letters of an alphabet, because they don’t mean anything; they are therefore cocoons of language, lingering in the antechamber of grammar and syntax, without ever crossing the threshold of articulation. They court the utopia of inarticulate language, that of the wind breathing in the desert, they say: “if the world has a future, it is an ascetic future” (Chatwin). In the end remains the image of geological immobility, of identity with nature in its mineral state, the field clear from all residues of desire.

1990

Sainte Marie aux Mines 2001

Bruxelles, le 21 septembre 2001

A l’heure où j’écris ces quelques lignes, à deux pas du Botanique où Kat Onoma joue ce soir, Salvatore Puglia doit être en train d'”installer”, comme on dit, son petit “Museum d’Histoire Industrielle” dans les locaux de la Société Industrielle de Sainte-Marie-aux-Mines.

Ce lieu en cours de rénovation, nous l’avons visité ensemble il y a trois semaines, tandis que nous préparions le festival “C’est dans la Vallée”. Il était tombé dans l’oubli. Ce fut comme pénétrer dans un sanctuaire abandonné: ce vestige poussiéreux d’un âge d’or industriel nous apparût, dans son absence d’apprêt, comme une sorte de musée parfait. Je crois que nous avons soudain partagé une vision: ce pur concentré d’histoire, cette archive intacte, avait aussi l’aspect d’une oeuvre d’art. Un petit musée d’art contemporain, signé par personne, fait de rien d’autre qu’une matière de signes.

Salvatore Puglia fut, avant d’être un artiste, un historien. Un tel lieu semble s’adresser à lui. Son travail d’artiste l’éloigne infiniment de ce qu’on appelle les arts plastiques, parce qu’il est de part en part traversé par le signe d’histoire, le temps en général est littéralement ce qui leste (de plomb) chacun de ses gestes d’art. A l’inverse, son rapport intime à l’histoire, d’une exceptionnelle intensité, est paradoxalement ce qui lui intima un jour d’abandonner sa profession d’historien (la tranquille explication des signes), et le jeta dans l’aventure d’un tout autre tracé, celui de la vie d’artiste, expression qui en ce qui le concerne n’a rien de désuet. Les nombreux tours et détours de sa magnifique pérégrination l’amènent aujourd’hui à croiser brièvement ce lieu, en ce moment même.

Je ne sais pas quel geste (à la fois hâtif, improvisé, et médité, selon sa manière),il est en train de tracer pour nous l’adresser en retour, dans l’amitié. Je me réjouis de le découvrir. Je le comprendrai sans comprendre, comme d’habitude. Un signe sans explication.

Rodolphe Burger

At the beginning of the twentieth Century a Society of Industrials was a place for the organisation of the production and the control of the working class, but it was also a kind of club for wealthy and enlightened individuals who, before their death, would bequeath their mineralogical, botanical, naturalistic or archaeological collections.
In an installation at the Société Industrielle of Sainte Marie aux Mines, in Alsace, I did set up three parallel disposals, according to a simple principle of displacement. Having had free access to the whole building, which, following the industrial crisis and the obsolete role of the Société, was undergoing partial demolition and reconstruction, I found under the roof and in cellars a large quantity of left over material: herbaria, archive files, fabric patterns and samples, fragments of statues, old portraits.
I displaced these various objects from one space to the other. I gathered portraits of the old Society presidents in the former meeting room – each one on his own chair. In a second meeting room, which is currently being used, I composed a circle of stuffed animals (somehow recalling a La Fontaine’s story). On the ground floor, in a space which is being demolished I reconstructed a modern meeting room furnished with iron and plastic tables and chairs – clean and ready to use.
In this way I experimented with different approaches to the question of creative displacement: I tried variations of it that would not be just simulative or utilitarian – as in the two previous examples of the vagabond’s shelter and the statues in storage- but, rather, estranging.

 

New York March-April 1995

Abstracts (of Anamnesis), Onassis Foundation, New York, 1995.

As Aristotle writes in his brief treatise On Memory and Reminiscence, “the same effect occurs in thinking as in drawing a diagram”, and “memory, even the memory of objects of thoughts, is not without an image.”

Abstracts of anamnesis or skeletal forms of reminiscence. Such forms must be more than one. No single formula could offer the ultimate image of the flotsam and jetsam of time, now that it is “out of joint.” But a series of images could offer at least a hint at a possible world, one among others. And they must be abstracts: summarized, but also free from any specific instance. There is no supreme lesson or famous last word to be learned from the barely legible scrawls which haunt the pictorial surface.

Writing abstracts conveys its graphic qualities apart from the object to which they belong. So does painting, in a way, gaining its own fantastic presence in this parting. So does thought ‑‑ or so did the Greeks say. Graphic, fantastic ‑‑ two Greek words, describing operations of the human hand, which Aristotle called the “organ of organs.” The image and the alphabet, phantasia and grammata, stand as the Scylla and Charybdis which define the straits the Greeks have left in their wake‑‑with thought. But what would a painting look like if the presence of painting were precisely the quality it aimed to convey`? How could it, at one stroke, accept the Greeks’ legacy and question it’? How could a legacy ever be shown, if not as a vanishing point? It is not so much a matter of memory. Rather, memories are at stake, as vestiges of memory: a recollection, or anamnesis, of anonymous bodies and sentences no one could sign now.

Christopher Fynsk’s text: Fynsk 1995

The exhibition catalogue: Abstracts catalogo 1995